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AKE
v.

OKLAHOMA

SUMMARY:

Petr contends that (1) he had a constitutional right as

an indigent defendant to be provided with the opportunity to establish

---

by expert psychiatric evidence his insanity defense; (2) denial of his
request for expert psychiatric assistance violated his right to
individualized sentencing; and (3) the prejudice resulting from his
appearance throughout his trial while forcibly drugged with the '?
~

sedative Thorazine is constitutionally offensive.
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FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

.

On Oct. 15, 1979, petr, acfe~mpanied by

·"

an accomplice, forcibly entered the home of Rev. Douglass.
Petr

Reverend, his wife and their two teenage
and his accomplice ransacked the Douglass' home as they hel

\

family at gunpoint.
the son.

They bound and gagged the Reverend,
twelve-

The two men then took turns attempting to rape
When they failed in

bound and

forced her to lie on the floor with the rest of her family.

Petr then

year-old daughter.

shot each of the family members.

Two died and two survi

a.

Petr was tried and convicted of two counts of murder and two
counts of shooting with intent to kill.
each of the murder charges.

He was sentenced to death for

At petr's arraignment in Oklahoma, the

presiding judge sua sponte ordered a psychiatric evaluation of petr's
mental state and competency to stand trial.

Petr was sent for

approximately two months of observation to a state mental institution.
Pursuant to Oklahoma statute, the staff of the mental health facility
examined petr's mental state only with respect to his then present
sanity and competence to stand trial.

-

------------ --

The TC held a special hearing to determine petr's competency to
stand trial.
~

""'--

At the hearing, which was six months after the offense,

__________,

I/

'\"\

two psychiatrists testified to petr's lack of sanity.

Neither

'

psychiatrist was asked his opinion as to whether petr was sane at the

------------

time of the offense.

After the hearing, the TC found petr to be

mentally ill and ordered petr recommitted to the state mental
hospital.

Pursuant to Oklahoma statute, the criminal proceedings

against petr were tem12._orarily suspended.

r--

After seven weeks at the hospital, the facility's forensic

'

a;~

7~

psychiatrist wrote a letter to the court expressing his opinion that

----------

petr was competent to stand tri~l.

He recommended that petr be

- 3 -
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maintained on the sedative Thorazine.

Without further inquiry, the

court reinstated the criminal charges against petr.
The court appointed counsel to represent petr because of his
indigency.

At a pretrial conference, petr's counsel informed the

court that petr would plead not guilty by reason of insanity and that
counsel needed the assistance of a psychiatrist to examine petr with
respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense in order to
prepare an adequate insanity defense.

Counsel argued that the

psychiatric testimony at the competency hearing raised a substantial
question of petr's sanity at the time of the offense and that in view
of petr's indigency, petr had a constitutional right to the assistance
of a court-appointed psychiatrist or the funds necessary to hire a
private psychiatrist.
The TC denied petr's request, noting that provision of a
psychiatric expert was not authorized by statute and that Oklahoma
practice was to deny indigent defendants such assistance or funds.

At

trial, the defense called the psychiatrists the state had relied on to
establish petr's incompetency and subsequent competency to stand
trial.

Ea ~

es~~~ied that petr was mentally ill, but none was abl ~ ~

to give an opinion about petr's sanity at the time of the offense

I

because they had not examined him for that purpose.
Pursuant to instructions of the psychiatrist from the mental
health facility, petr was sedated with Thorazine throughout his trial.
Petr remained mute throughout the trial, refused to converse with his
attorneys and stared straight ahead during both stages of the
proceedings.

Petr's counsel objected to the heavy sedation because it

rendered petr "zombie"-like, prejudicing him before the jury and

'

rendering him incapable of assisting his attorneys •

-

-
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After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, during the

' .... l

sentencing stage, the State relied on the testimony of psychiatrists
to establish an aggravating circumstance, i.e., that petr would
predictably commit future acts of violence.

Petr had no psychiatric

witness to rebut the State's psychiatric testimony, and no psychiatric
assistance necessary to prepare and establish mitigating evidence,
such as petr's mental state at the time of the offense or the
psychological effects of the child abuse he suffered.

Petr was

sentenced to death.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment and
sentence.

The court rejected petr's contention that the State has the

responsibility of providing psychiatric services to indigents charged
'

ith capital crimes.

Alternatively, the cour!._ ( ound that the argument

-----

M l ~ was not preserved in the motion for new trial and was thereb;-wai ~ d.
As to n~ ffect of Thorazine, the court noted expert testimony that

--

\__./

---

Jf

without the benefit of the medication, petr could revert to a violent
state, but that with it, petr was competent to stand trial and assist
his attorneys.

The court found "no reason to believe the [petr's]

behavior was caused by any factor other than his own volition."
;'

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that he had a constitutional right to

expert psychiatric assistance and that indigency alone prevented him
from introducing evidence to negate criminal responsibility.

This

right derives from the equal protection and due process clauses as
well as the Sixth Amendment.
1154, 1163 (CAS 1974)

See United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d

(reversing conviction where indigent defendant

was not provided with a psychiatrist's assistance in preparing and
proving his defense).

Petr also claims that denial of expert

psychiatric assistance violated his right to individualized sentencing
and to rebut the aggravating circumstance of his preducted future

..

•

violence which the prosecution established by the use of psychiatric
testimony •
Petr also argues that the prejudice to him resulting from his
appearance throughout the trial while forcibly drugged with the
sedative Thorazine is constitutionally offensive.

The demeanor in

court of one who has raised the issue of his sanity is itself of
probative value to the fact finder.
The State responds that petr was not entitled to psychiatric
assistance because petr was allowed to call as witnesses the two
psychiatrists and a physician who had examined petr in order to
determine his ability to stand trial.

The State also argues that

there is nothing in the record to support petr's contention that he
was insane at the time of offense, and there are indications that petr
was in fact sane.
he signed.

For example, petr gave a detailed confession which

Furthermore, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in the

present case held that this argument was waived.

Thorazine, resp states that petr's attorneys withdrew their motion for
trial on present sanity and raised the issue only only in closing
argument.

The argument was therefore waived.

DISCUSSION:

This Court has previously granted cert on the

question whether the constitution requires the State to provide a
defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity with the
assistance of a psychiatrist. ~ ~ush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963)
curiam).

The Court never addressed the question, however.

(per

Although

the issue is therefore obviously certworthy, the court below held that
petr had waived the claim.

Since this appears to be an adequate and

independent state ground for the Oklahoma court's decision, I do not
I

recommend granting cert to decide this question.

7

As to the effect of -

..

""t

.~,
'
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"

Petr's principal argument with respect to the Thorazine is that
his appearance before the jury while drugged denied him a fair chance
for the jury favorably to assess his demeanor and character.

The

Oklahoma court did not address the question, and it is unclear that it
was raised below.

As to the Thorazine argument petr did raise, the

Oklahoma court relied on the testimony of experts
in concluding that
--,

ye
\J

drug did not prevent petr from assisting his lawyers.

argument~

con~ ; ; _ , : ;s ~

a-;:-;:;-f ~ :al~

Petr's

I therefore

recommend denial.
There is a response.
November 22, 1983
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GLEN BURTON AKE, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
No. 83--5424. Decided February-, 1984
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
This case poses an important federal constitutional issue:
whether, under an ·
nces a defendant has a constitutional
e assistance of a psychiatrist in t e
preparation of his defense. Affirmmg
viction and death sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the federal constitution imposes no such
obligation. This holding appears to violate the petitioner's
right to effective assistance of counsel, a Sixth Amendment
protection applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). The holding also appears to violate the petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has previously indicated a willingness to consider this issue which
continues to generate conflict between various state and federal courts. That this is a capital case adds special urgency
to the need to review the issue posed by the petitioner. I
would therefore vote to grant and respectfully dissent from
the Court's denial of certiorari.
I
In the winter of 1979, in Canadian County, Oklahoma, the
petitioner, Glen Burton Ake, Jr., was charged with murdering a couple and wounding the couple's two children. Ake v.
State, 663 P. 2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). At his arraignment the petitioner was ejected for disruptive behavior.
Subsequently, the judge who presided at the arraignment ordered, sua sponte, that Ake be given a psychiatric evaluation
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to determine his competency to stand trial. Ake spent approximately two months at a mental hospital where he was
evaluated only with respect to his competency to stand trial;
no evaluation was made concerning his state of mind at the
time of the crime. On April 10, 1980, after a hearing in
which several psychiatrists testified to petitioner's lack of
present sanity, the trial court found Ake to be mentally ill
and committed him to the state mental hospital. On May 27,
1980, the trial court reinstated criminal charges against Ake.
Although the trial judge gave no reason for his decision, it
appears to have been influenced by a letter written by the
mental hospital's chief forensic psychiatrist. The letter
stated that in the opinion of the hospital staff Ake had improved to the point where he would be capable of understanding the charges against him and of aiding his attorney with
his defense. See ~pp. to Pet. for Cert. A-20.
Because Ake is indigent and could not afford counsel, the
court appointed an attorney to represent him. At a pretrial
conference, the attorney informed the court of the petitioner's intention to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The
attorney then requested that the court either appoint a psychiatrist to examine the petitioner or provide the petitioner
with the funds necessary to obtain an examination. According to the petitioner's attorney, an expert psychiatric evaluation was needed in order to assert a competent defense. 1
The trial judge denied this request on the grounds that the
federal Constitution did not compel the expenditure of funds
1
Pleading with the trial court for assistance in obtaining the services of a
psychiatrist, Ake's attorney stated that "[t]o deny to this client .. . funds
for the preparations would be a miscarriage of justice . . . because an attorney has got to have . . . funds to properly defend his client. . . . I cannot
possibly believe [that] a few meager dollars is going to stand between a
man charged with Murder in the First Degree [and] a constitutional, fair
and impartial trial. . . . Life, itself is far too precious to consider any
monetary value that might be expended within reason. " See App. to Pet.
for Cert. at A-30.

AKE v. OKLAHOMA
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for an examination and that the court was without statutory
authority to expend state funds for such a purpose. 2
The petitioner was tried in one day. He attempted to establish his insanity defense by calling as witnesses the two
psychiatrists and the physician who had initially found him to
be incompetent to stand trial but subsequently found him to
be competent. None of these witnesses was able to offer an
opinion about petitioner's sanity at the time of the offense because they had only examined him for the limited purpose of
determining his competency to stand trial. The petitioner
thus received no psychiatric examination relating to his sanity at the time of the offense. At the sentencing phase of the
trial, the State relied on expert psychiatric testimony to establish the petitioner's "future dangerousness," one of the aggravating circumstances upon which the jury hinged its death
sentence. 3 Lacking access to a psychiatrist, the petitioner
The trial judge denied the petitioner's request in an oral ruling in
which he observed that he was "aware of" United States. ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi 344 U. S. 561 (1953), "in which the U. S. Supreme Court held that a
State does not have a constitutional duty to provide private psychiatric
examination to indigent defendants." App to Pet. for Cert. at A-31. The
trial judge commented further that state law mandates that "courts may
not-repeat, 'not'-spend any court funds unless specifically authorized by
statute. This has been more and more strictly construed against courts,
and so unless I can see some specific authority, I could not even consider
[granting the defendant's request.] The request for private psychiatric
evaluation at the expense of the State is denied. You may have the defendant available, if you are able to arrange it, in some other manner."
Ibid.
3
Under Oklahoma law, the jury must find at least one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance in order for the death penalty to be imposed. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. In this case, the jury found
three aggravating circumstances: that the petitioner was likely to commit
future acts of violence, that the crime was committed to avoid arrest, and
that the crime was especially cruel, heinous and atrocious. Ake v. State,
supra, at 11.
In Zant v. Stephens, - - V. S. - - (1983), this Court upheld the imposition of a death penalty in a case where the jury made multiple findings of
aggravating circumstances, one of which was invalidated on appeal. The
Court held that given the particular structure of the death penalty statute
2

4

AKE v. OKLAHOMA

offered no expert testimony to rebut the opinion of the
State's expert.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the death sentence. Ake v. State, supra. In response to the petitioner's claim that the district court had
erred in not providing him with any expert psychiatric assistance, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that notwithstanding the unique nature of a capital case, "the State does not
have the responsibility of providing such services to indigents
charged with capital crimes." Id., at 6.

II
In defending the holding of the Court of Appeals, the State
forgoes any justification of the Court of Appeals' constitutional holding. Instead, the State maintains that the constitutional question need not be reached because, in this case,
the petitioner failed to put into serious question the issue of
his sanity at the time of the offense. According to the State,
petitioner's sanity was never in serious question because he
had had no prior history of mental illness, reportedly expressed fear once he learned that the children of the murat issue, the invalidation of one finding of aggravating circumstances did
not require the invalidation of the sentence as a whole so long as at least
one valid finding was available to support the imposition of capital punishment. Under the death penalty statute at issue in Zant, the jury was not
instructed "to balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard." Id., at - - . Indeed that statute did not
require the jury to undertake any balancing of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Id., at--. Oklahoma's death penalty statute, by contrast, does require such balancing. It states that "[u]nless at least one of
the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is so found
or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by
the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty
shall not be imposed." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. The reasoning of
Zant, then, does not appear to control this case; if one aggravating circumstance is invalidated on appeal, the death sentence itself must be vacated
even in the presence of other, unchallenged findings of aggravating circumstances. See Zant v. Stephens , supra, at - - (JUSTICE MARSHALL
dissenting).
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dered parents had survived their wounds, and gave a detailed and lucid post-arrest confession. Brief in Opp. ~The central problem with this analysis is that it wholly ignores the reason the trial court offered as to why it refused to
appoint a psychiatrist to aid the petitioner with his insanity
defense. There is no indication whatsoever that the trial
court's ruling was predicated upon a finding that petitioner
had failed to present a colorable showing of insanity at the
time of the offense. 4 Rather, the trial court rejected petitioner's request for a court-appointed psychiatrist on the
grounds that it lacked statutory authorization to make such
an appointment and that the federal Constitution did not
compel it to satisfy the petitioner's request. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court on these
same grounds. 5 See Ake v. State, 663 P. 2d, at 6. Thus, con'Neither the trial court nor the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
made any inquiry into whether the petitioner could make a colorable showing that he was insane at the time of the offense. They apparently assumed that the petitioner would have no constitutional right to psychiatric
assistance no matter what sort of showing he was capable of making.
That the petitioner succeeded in raising insanity to the status of a colorable issue is indicated by the fact that the jury received an insanity instruction. See Ake v. State, supa, at 10.
Rejecting the claim that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the
evidence that the petitioner was not guilty by reason of insanity, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that the petitioner "failed to establish any reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the time the crimes were committed." Id.
Whether the petitioner established reasonable doubt as to his sanity is a far
different issue, however, than whether the petitioner made enough of a
showing to put his sanity into question. While the former relates to the
final resolution of a claim of insanity, the latter entails a preliminary decision relating to whether a defendant has made an initial showing substantial enough to warrant the appointment of a psychiatrist.
5
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals also held that the petitioner's claim
had not been properly preserved in the motion for a new trial and that it
had thus been waived. Ibid. Assuming that the petitioner failed to satisfy Oklahoma's procedural requirements for preserving claims on appeal,
this Court can still properly exercise jurisdiction over this case because the
Oklahoma Courtof Appeals' ruled on the merits of petitioner's constitu-
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trary to the State's suggestion, this Court must indeed reach
the federal constitutional issue in order properly to adjudicate this case.
The issue presented by this case is whether, under any circumstances, a defendant has a federal constitutional right to
the services of a psychiatrist for the purpose of preparing a
defense to a criminal prosecution in a state court. The Court
granted certiorari to consider this question in Bush v. Texas,
372 U. S. 586 (1963). In Bush an indigent defendant who
had previously been adjudicated insane was charged and convicted of theft. At trial, the defendant pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity and requested that the court either send
him to a state medical institution for observation and diagnosis or appoint and pay for a psychiatrist for this purpose.
The trial judge rejected this request, noting that the court
"had no fund or money for so-called psychiatrists, alienists,
quacks or specialists." Brief for Petitioner in Bush v.
Texas, 0. T. 1962, No. 511, p. 3. This Court declined to resolve this issue only because the Assistant Attorney General
of Texas indicated at oral argument that he would seek to
have the defendant retried based upon a post-conviction psychiatric evaluation of the defendant which showed that the
defendant was then mentally ill and that he may have been
mentally ill at the time of the crime. Bush v. Texas, supra,
at 590. 6
tional claim. A ruling on the merits of a federal question by the highest
state court leaves the federal question open to review by this Court. See,
e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 161-162 (1978)
6
The trial court evidently believed that United States ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953) decided the issue posed by petitioner for it cited
Baldi for the proposition that "a State does not have a constitutional duty
to provide psychiatric examinations to indigent defendants." App. to Pet.
for Cert. at A-31. Baldi stands for no such proposition. Smith claimed
that his conviction and death sentence was invalid because the State had
deprived him of the assistance of a psychiatrist. The Court rejected the
petitioner's assertion not on the grounds that the federal Constitution did
not compel the provision of a psychiatrist but rather on the grounds that, in
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Equally as significant as the Court's previous willingness
to consider the issue posed by this case, is the history of Bush
subsequent to this Court's remand. In state court, the defendant was found to be sane. A federal district court, however, granted habeas corpus relief to the defendant on the
grounds that the state court had failed to provide the petitioner with an adequate process by which to establish his insanity claim. Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (ND
Tex. 1964), aff'd, 334 F. 2d 672 (CA5 1965). More specifically, the federal district court ruled that the state court had
violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel by refusing, prior to trial, either to commit the defendant
fact, the petitioner had had the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation as to his
sanity at the time of the crime and that that evaluation sufficed to satisfy
the requirements of due process. 344 U. S., at 568.
One sentence in Baldi, if quoted out of context, seems to support the interpretation of the holding urged by respondent. In that sentence, the
Court remarked that a State does not have the duty by federal constitutional mandate to appoint a psychiatrist to make a pretrial examination.
Ibid. What the Court clearly meant was that a State was under no constitutional compulsion to provide a defendant with psychiatric assistance
once a court-appointed psychiatrist had examined the defendant as to his
sanity at the time of the crime and presented to the jury his expert opinion
on the issue. Because the defendant had had the benefit of at least some
expert testimony regarding his alleged insanity at the time of the offense,
the Court found that the requirements of due process were satisfied. In
the words of the Court, "the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard by the
trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suffices." Id. Here, by contrast, no psychiatrist testified as to the petitioner's sanity at the time of
the offense.
Apart from being readily distinguishable on the facts, Baldi offers little
precedential value with respect to the legal issues at stake here because it
predates this Court's enlargement of the affirmative duty of the states to
provide to indigent defendants the legal tools necesary for a fair trial.
Among the landmark decisions that postdate Baldi and erode the proposition for which the the trial court cited it are Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12
(1956) (constitutional right to transcript for appeal as ofright from criminal
conviction), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (constitutional
right to counsel in felony trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963)
(constitutional right to counsel for direct appeal).
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to a state facility for examination or to appoint a psychiatrist
to examine him. The federal district court justified its ruling by observing that "the right to counsel is meaningless if
the lawyer is unable to make an effective defense because he
has no funds to provide the specialized testimony which the
case requires." Id., at 565. 7 Other courts have indicated
support for the analysis suggested by Bush, especially in the
context of a capital case. See, e. g., Blake v. Zant, 513 F.
Supp. 772, 787 (SD Ga. 1981) (habeas corpus relief granted
because "in a capital case, a defendant whose sanity at the
time of the alleged crime is fairly in question , has at a minimum the constitutional right to at least one psychiatric
examination at state expense.") (emphasis in original). 8
7
The Sixth Amendment guarantees, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions , the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of counsel." The Court has long recognized, however, that
this right is vitiated when the circumstances surrounding the appointment
of counsel deny a defendant "effective and substantial aid." Alabama v.
Powell, 287 U. S. 45, 53 (1932). See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U. S. 475, 489-490 (1978); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446 (1940).
Similarly, this Court has prohibited government conduct that would render
ineffective an attorney's assistance to a defendant. See, e.g., Moore v.
Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977); Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976);
United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967).
8
See also Hintz v. Beto, 379 F. 2d 937, 941-943 (CA5 1967); Jacobs v.
United States, 350 F. 2d 571, 573 (CA41965); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F. 2d 691, 691>-696 (CA71965), aff'd in part and remanded
in part on other grounds 383 U. S. 375. But see Watson v. Patterson, 358
F. 2d 297 (CAlO), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 876 (1966); United States ex rel.
Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489, 492-493(ND Ga. 1971); Houghtaling
v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 163 S. E. 2d 560, 562 (1968) cert. denied
394 U. S. 1021 (1969). A useful listing of relevant cases is contained in
Weeks, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State by
Appointment of Investigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970 & 1983
Supp.).
For commentary urging the recognition of a constitutional right, under
certain conditions, to psychiatric assistance see Goldstein and Fine, The
Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1061 (1962); Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to
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Congress recognized the imperative need to provide indigents with access to experts by enacting 18 U. S. C.
§ 3006A(e). Section 3006A(e) entitles a defendant in a federal criminal trial to obtain the service of experts, including
psychiatrists, if he cannot otherwise afford such services and
if the psychiatrists assistance is "necessary for an adequate
defense." 9 Similar statutes have been enacted by at least
forty states. 10 What these federal and state statutes reflect
is a widespread recognition that when an indigent defendant
asserts a colorable insanity defense, it is fundamentally unfair to try him without providing him with at least some minimal degree of assistance in presenting his defense through
expert testimony by a psychiatrist. 11
It is difficult to imagine a case where expert testimony is as
essential to a constitutionally adequate trial as where a defendant, facing a possible death sentence, pleads not guilty
by reason of insanity. An extraordinary amount of attention
Independent Psychiatrist, 7 Tulsa L. Rev. 137 (1971); Note, The lndigent's
Right to An Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in
Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 632 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in
Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn. L. Rev.
1054 (1963).
9
18 U. S. C. § 3006A(e)(l) provides in pertinent part that counsel for a
defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry that in an ex
parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is
financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. The compensation is generally limited to $300 plus reimbursement for expenses. Id. (3).
10
See statutes cited in Recent Developments,-Equal Protection-Refusal to Provide Expert Witness for Indigent Defendant Denies Equal Protection, 59 Wash. U.L. Quart. 317, 321 n. 18 (1981). See also A.
Moenssens & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 10 n. 19
(1978).
11
See American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed.
1982): "The quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet
valueless to the defendant if the defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist ... and no such services are available." Id., at 5.20.
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has been dedicated to establishing the standard by which to
define insanity, but the most important factor in determining
whether a standard-whatever its content-is correctly applied to a particular individual "is whether the accused has a
psychiatrist at all to aid him in making his defense."
Goldstein and Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist,
and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1061, 1061
(1962) For good or for ill, psychiatrists have become key figures in the criminal adversarial process; the conclusions they
draw from their arcane science significantly influence both
findings of guilt or innocence and determinations of appropriate punishment. 12 The mantle of presumed expertise with
which our society has cloaked the views of psychiatrists
makes access to their opinion and testimony essential in a
trial where insanity is the central issue. 13 Deprived of access
12

"The opinion of psychiatrists can have substantial or decisive influence
in the determination of whether a defendant is fit to stand trial, whether he
is responsible for a crime, and whether he is to be executed or given a life
sentence." Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and
Correction, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 650, 650 (1958). See also J.
Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry (1980); Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev.
527 (1978); Slovenko, The Insanity Defense in the Wake of the Hinkley
Trial, 14 Rutgers L. J. 373 (1983); Slovenko, Reflections on the Criticisms
of Psychiatric Expert Testimony, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 37 (1978).
In recent years there have been a number of highly-publicized cases in
which psychiatric assistance to the defense reportedly proved of decisive
importance in obtaining verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. See,
e. g., Taylor, Too Much Justice, Harper's 56 (Sept. 1982) (reporting on the
acquittal by reason of insanity of John W. Hinckley, Jr., accused of having
attempted to assassinate the President of the United States)
13
Commenting on the powerful influence of psychiatric testimony, JusTICE BLACKMUN recently observed that in the sentencing phase of a capital
case the testimony of the state's psychiatrist, "colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's
words, equates with death itself." Barefoot v. Estelle, - - U. S. - - ,
- - (1983) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissenting).
Commentators have noted the frequently exaggerated influence that expert psychiatric testimony exerts not only over juries but over lawyers as

;
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to the services a psychiatrist offers, a defense attorney asserting an insanity defense is ineffectual. 14
When a defendant, because of indigency, is forced to forgo
the services of a psychiatrist, the balance of advantage between the accused and the prosecution tilts decisively and unfairly in favor of the latter. This is especially true where, as
here, the prosecution repeatedly calls to the jury's attention
the lack of a psychiatrist's opinion as to the sanity of the defendant at the time of the crime. 15 The unfairness is heightened still further where the state uses its psychiatrist to establish an aggravating circumstance in the capital sentencing
trial of a defendant. 16 Here, the state prosecutor used the
judges as well. See, e.g., Morse, supra, n. 12, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. at
535-536 ("Much of the legal doctrine and operation of the mental health
legal system depends on the assumptions and learning of mental health science. Most lawyers regard mental disorders as arcane and disturbing
phenomena that are beyond their comprehension and are understooq by
only a few highly trained experts . . .
Lawyers therefore tend to defer
to mental health experts, and mental health law decisions at all levels, especially if the proceedings are not truly adversary, are often based more on
psychiatric reasoning and conclusions than on legal reasoning.") (footnotes
omitted).
14
"[It] is a matter of common knowledge, that upon the trial of certain
issues, such as insanity ... experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense. . . [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage if
he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts
of those against him." Reilly v. Barry, 250 N. Y. 456, 461, 166 N. E. 165,
167 (1929) (Cardozo, C. J.).
15
For example, the following colloquy resulted from the State prosecutor's questioning of one of the psychiatrists who examined the petitioner as
to his competency to stand trial:
"Q. Is there any place, in any report you have ever seen, or anything you
have had the benefit to review, that has said this defendant was legally insane in October or November of 1979 [the time when the offense was
committed]?"
"A. No, sir."
"Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether-"
"A. No, sir." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45.
See also App to Pet. for Cert. A-34, A-36, A-49, A-51.
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testimony of a psychiatrist to establish the petitioner's "future dangerousness." 17 By contrast, the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to develop expert testimony which
might have provided a persuasive rebuttal. That the state
saw fit to use its own psychiatrist in the prosecution of the
defendant is a strong indication that, in the circumstances of
this case, the services of a psychiatrist was not a mere luxury
but a pressing necessity. 18
In two recent decisions, this Court has recognized the need
for an attorney to be aided by a psychiatrist in the preparation of a case where insanity is the asserted defense. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), the Court held that the
Fifth Amendment prohibited the admission into evidence,
over the defendant's objection, of statements obtained by a
state psychiatrist in pretrial interviews in which the defendant was not warned that his responses might be used against
him. The Court suggested, however, that where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, he must be
16
"Securing the services of experts to examine evidence, to advise counsel, and to rebut the prosecution's case is probably the single most critical
factor in defending a case in which novel scientific evidence is introduced."
Gianelli, The Admissability of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Col. L. Rev. 1198, 1243 (1980). There
are, however, widespread disparities between the State's ability to obtain
the assistance of experts and the ability of defendants, especially, indigent
defendants to obtain such assistance. Id. at 1244-1245 ("The underlying
problem is that the 'burden of rebuttal is generally borne . . . by defendants without the economic means to marshall scientific witnesses for the
battle of the experts.' " (citation omitted)).
11
See App. to Pet for Cert. A-50, A-64, A-65.
18
Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 344 ("Lawyers to prosecute
are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers thay can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.")

;
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deemed to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in order to allow the State's psychiatrist to examine him; otherwise, a defendant could deprive the State of
"the only effective means" it has of controverting his claim of
insanity. Id., at 465. This suggestion indicates how, in certain contexts, the Court clearly perceives that psychiatric assistance is crucial to the proper functioning of the adversary
process. This perception should have pushed the Court to
grant certiorari in this case. After all, if the State's only effective means of controverting a defendant's insanity defense
is through examination of the defendant by the State's psychiatrists, it stands to reason that a defendant's only effective
means of establishing an insanity defense will also necessarily
entail the aid of a psychiatrist.
Barefoot v. Estelle, - - U. S. - - (1983), evinces a similar acknowledgement that psychiatric assistance on both
sides is required for the proper functioning of the adversary
process where sanity is at issue. In Barefoot the Court upheld the practice of admitting into evidence expert psychiatric testimony regarding the future dangerousness of defendants. It stated that "[i]f the jury may make up its mind
about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric
testmony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the
views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views
of the defendant's doctors." Id., at - - (emphasis added).
The Court noted that in Barefoot no evidence was offered at
trial to contradict the testimony of the State's psychiatrists.
The Court declared, however, that this lack of expert assistance on behalf of the defendant did not undermine the legitimacy of the conviction because there had been no indication
that, despite the defendant's indigency, the trial court had
refused to provide the defendant with an expert. Id., at n.
5. Here the trial court did refuse to provide an expert. At
another point in the opinion, the Court stated that one reason
why it would allow psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness to be admitted into evidence is that the adversary
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system will be competent to uncover, recognize and take due
account of any shortcomings in such testimony. Id., at--.
If, however, the defendant lacks access to a psychiatrist, his
ability to uncover weaknesses will be hampered, the adversary process will be distorted, and the special carefulness required of adjudication in capital cases will be compromised.
Two other factors further underline the fundamental unfairness which has tainted the judicial proceedings against
this petitioner. First, Ake requested the assistance of a
psychiatrist not at post-conviction proceedings but rather at
trial where the State's purpose "is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600,
610 (1974). The Court has recognized that it is precisely at
this stage, where a presumptively innocent defendant is attempting to ward off the State's accusations of criminality,
that his claim to state-sponsored assistance in erecting a defense is most compelling. Ibid.
Second, this case arises from a State's attempt to condemn
a man to death. In a wide variety of contexts, this Court has
recognized that the unique character of a capital trial requires that it be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of
factfinding. 19 It has thus been noted that "[w]hat is essential
[in the sentencing phase of a capital case] is that the jury
As I noted in Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, a t - , this Court has time
and again condemned procedures in capital cases that might be acceptable
in ordinary cases. For example, long before this Court recognized the right
to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, it established
that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, supra. Other instances in
which this Court has required more stringent procedural standards in the
context of a capital trial include the circumstances under which the Double
Jeopardy Clause can be invoked, Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430
(1981); the circumstances under which a judge must instruct a jury as to
lesser included offenses, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); and the
circumstances under which a trial judge must be allowed to consider mitigating evidence, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978).
1
•

;
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have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion). Here,
however, despite the petitioner's plea that he was insane at
the time of the crime, the State has condemned him to death
without the benefit of any expert opinion regarding his insanity claim. Moreover, as to the issue of the petitioner's future
dangerousness, the only expert opinion offered was that of
the State's psychiatrists. Such one-sidedness made a mockery of the adversary system and tainted the proceedings
against the petitioner with the sort of egregious unfairness
which violates the federal constitutional guarantee of Due
Process.
Closely related to Ake's claim that he was denied Due
Process is his claim that he was denied Equal Protection of
the laws. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 19 (1956). Yet this case
presents in extreme fashion the spectacle of indigency subverting our pious allegiance to "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW." Had the petitioner been a man of means, he would
undoubtedly have obtained the services of a psychiatrist.
As an indigent, however, petitioner was left bereft of any access to the specialized knowledge necessary to an insanity defense. This squalid distinction between the justice afforded
a person of means asserting an insanity defense and an indigent asserting an insanity defense offends the notion of
equality that is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whenever the Fourteenth Amendment is read to impose
upon the States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps
flowing from differences in economic circumstances," 20 certain objections are invariably raised. The most important of
these objections is that the equality principle articulated in
Griffin goes too far and knows no stable limits: "Once loosed,
2!) Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 34 Oustice Harlan dissenting).

:

;
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the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1966).
Distinguished Justices of this
Court have warned that there is simply no way consistently
to administer application of the Griffin principle since a thoroughgoing implementation of it would require a level of judicial intervention which would be antithetical to other constitutional values and far outside the institutional capabilities
But in applying the Griffin principle, this
of this Court. 21
Court has always been aware of these difficulties and has implemented this principle with a necessary respect for
practicalities: "Absolute equality is not required; lines can be
drawn and are drawn and we often sustain them." Douglas
v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357 (1963). 22
21
Justice Harlan was perhaps the most articulate critic of the position I
assert. See, e. g., Id., at 29-39; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S., at
360-367 (dissenting opinion); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40, 43-44
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
22
A useful general response to the fears expressed by Justice Harlan was
set forth in Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and
the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963):
"[G]overnmental obligation to deal effectively with problems of poverty in
the administration of criminal justice . . . does not presuppose a general
commitment . . . to relieve impoverished persons of the consequences of
limited means, whenever or however manifested.
The obligation of government in the criminal cases rests on wholly different considerations and reflects principles of much more limited application.
The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which this Report
is concerned arise in a process initiated by government for the achievement of basic governmental purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has
as one of its consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the persons proceeded against. . . . When government chooses to exert its powers in the criminal area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking
reasonable measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just
administration of the law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While government
may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may properly
be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of
justice." Id., at 9.

;

;
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In this case, two factors serve as reliable lines within which
to circumscribe application of the Griffin principle. The first
involves the nature of the assistance the petitioner sought
from the State. The petitioner sought assistance from the
State that was essential to effective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, even if the psychiatric assistance the petitioner
sought is not deemed a requirement under the Due Process
Clause, it is nonetheless of sufficient importance in the administration of a criminal trial that it cannot be withheld from
a defendant, solely on account of his indigency, without violating the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, it would be
absurd to require that an indigent be furnished with "every
possible legal tool, no matter how speculative its value, and
no matter how devoid of assistance it may be, merely because
a person of unlimited means might choose to waste his resources in a quest of that kind." United States v.
MacCollom, 426 u. s. 317, 330 (1976) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN
concurring) (emphasis added). What the Griffin principle
does require, however, is that "the State must, as a matter of
equal protection, provide indigent [defendants] with the
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal when those tools
are available for a price to other [defendants]." Britt v.
North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226, 227 (1971) (emphasis added).
Griffin does not mandate a utopian quest for absolute equality with respect to every aspect of the adversary process, but
it does mandate substantial equality with respect to important features of that process. Psychiatric assistance in a
capital case in which the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity clearly qualifies as a feature of the adversary
process important enough to trigger the protection of the
Equal Protection Clause. 23
In Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, the Court decided that a psychiatrist's
prediction of a defendant's future dangerousness is properly admissible because of the ability of the adversarial process to ferret out unreliable testimony. JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted in dissent that "the Court's reasoning
suggests that, were a defendant to show that he was unable, for financial
23
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The second limiting feature of this case involves the nature
of the proceeding against the petitioner: he was on trial for
his life. Because the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake, there is a corresponding
need in that context to be especially intolerant of arrangements that make the quality of justice a defendant obtains a
mere reflection of his position in our society's socio-economic
hierarchy. Thus, at least with respect to capital cases, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that states provide defendants asserting a colorable insanity defense with reasonable
access to expert psychiatric assistance.
Because it is probable that the ruling of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals violates the petitioner's federal
constitutional rights and because the petitioner has posed important federal constitutional issues about which there is
much disagreement among state and federal courts, I dissent
from the Court's denial of certiorari.

:
or other reasons, to obtain an adequate rebuttal expert, a constitutional
U. S. a t - , n. 12. This case presents
violation might be found." the very issue that JUSTICE BLACKMUN anticipated, at least with respect
to petitioner's inability to obtain a psychiatrist at the sentencing phase of
his trial.

,.

~

. t.~

~

L

~ ~?>~"' ~ h . ~

'

.

'

c__/fL_

.
,

;

./J,/t.
L7

1

•

/f.,,,CA/'-

P4--

~

~

·
/

'-'

The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

Justice Marshall
Circulated: FEB 2 7 1984

From:

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
1st DRAFT
,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GLEN BURTON AKE, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
No. 83-5424.

Decided February - , 1984

JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
This case poses an important federal constitutional issue:
whether, under any circumstances, a defendant has ~nstitutional right to the assistance of a s chiatrist in the
preparation of is e ense.
ffirming the petit10ner s conviction and aeath sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the federal constitution imposes no such
obligation. This holding appears to violate the petitioner's
right to effective assistance of counsel, a Sixth Amendment
protection applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). The holding also appears to violate the petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has previously indicated a willingness to consider this issue which
continues to generate conflict between various state and fed1 s
ca · c
~
eral cou s.
ha
to tlieneed to review the issue posed by the petitioner. I
would therefore vote to grant and respectfully dissent from
the Court's denial of certiorari.
I
In the winter of 1979, in Canadian County, Oklahoma, the
petitioner, Glen Burton Ake, Jr., was charged with murdering a couple and wounding the couple's two children. Ake v.
State, 663 P. 2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). At his arraignment the petitioner was ejected for disruptive behavior.
Subsequently, the judge who presided at the arraignment ordered, sua sponte, that Ake be given a psychiatric evaluation

:
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to determine his competency to stand trial. Ake spent approximately two months at a mental hospital where he was
evaluated only with respect to his competency to stand trial;
no evaluation was made concerning his state of mind at the
time of the crime. On April 10, 1980, after a hearing in
which several psychiatrists testified to petitioner's lack of
present sanity, the trial court found Ake to be mentally ill
and committed him to the state mental hospital. On May 27,
1980, the trial court reinstated criminal charges against Ake.
Although the trial judge gave no reason for his decision, it
appears to have been influenced by a letter written by the
mental hospital's chief forensic psychiatrist. The letter
stated that in the opinion of the hospital staff Ake had improved to the point where he would be capable of understanding the charges against him and of aiding his attorney with
his defense. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-20.
Because Ake is indigent and could not afford counsel, the
court appointed an attorney to represent him. At a pretrial
conference, the attorney informed the court of the petitioner's intention to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The J
attorney then re uested that the court either a ppoint a psychiatrist to ex~
he petitioner or provide the petitioner
with the funds necessary to obtain an examination. According to the petitioner's attorney, an expert psychiatric evaluation was needed in order to assert a competent defense. 1
The trial judge denied this request on the grounds that the
federal Constitution did not compel the expenditure of funds
Pleading with the trial court for assistance in obtaining the services of a
psychiatrist, Ake's attorney stated that "[t]o deny to this client ... funds
for the preparations would be a miscarriage of justice ... because an attorney has got to have . . . funds to properly defend his client. . . . I cannot
possibly believe [that] a few meager dollars is going to stand between a
man charged with Murder in the First Degree [and] a constitutional, fair
and impartial trial. . . . Life, itself is far too precious to consider any
monetary value that might be expended within reason." See App. to Pet.
for Cert. at A-30.
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for an examination and that the court was without statutory
authority to expend state funds for such a purpose. 2
The petitioner was tried in one day. He attempted to establish his insanity defense by calling as witnesses the two
psychiatrists and the physician who had initially found him to
be incompetent to stand trial but subsequently found him to
be competent. None of these witnesses was able to offer an
opinion about petitioner's sanity at the time of the offense because they had only examined him for the limited purpose of
determining his competency to stand trial. The petitioner
thus received no psychiatric examination relating to his sanity at the time of the offense. At the sentencing phase of the
trial, the State relied on expert psychiatric testimony to establish the petitioner's "future dangerousness," one of the aggravating circumstances upon which the jury hinged its death
sentence. 3 Lacking access to a psychiatrist, the petitioner
2
The trial judge denied the petitioner's request in an oral ruling in
which he observed that he was "aware of" United States. ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi 344 U. S. 561 (1953), "in which the U. S. Supreme Court held that a
State does not have a constitutional duty to provide private psychiatric
examination to indigent defendants." App to Pet. for Cert. at A-31. The
trial judge commented further that state law mandates that "courts may
not-repeat, 'not'-spend any court funds unless specifically authorized by
statute. This has been more and more strictly construed against courts,
and so unless I can see some specific authority, I could not even consider
[granting the defendant's request.] The request for private psychiatric
evaluation at the expense of the State is denied. You may have the defendant available, if you are able to arrange it, in some other manner."
Ibid.
3
Under Oklahoma law, the jury must find at least one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance in order for the death penalty to be imposed. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. In this case, the jury found
three aggravating circumstances: that the petitioner was likely to commit
future acts of violence, that the crime was committed to avoid arrest, and
that the crime was especially cruel, heinous and atrocious. Ake v. State,
supra, at 11.
In Zant v. Stephens , - - U. S. - - (1983), this Court upheld the imposition of a death penalty in a case where the jury made multiple findings of
aggravating circumstances, one of which was invalidated on appeal. The
Court held that given the particular structure of the death penalty statute
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offered no expert testimony to rebut the opinion of the
State's expert.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the death sentence. Ake v. State, supra. In response to the petitioner's claim that the district court had
erred in not providing him with any expert psychiatric assistance, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that notwithstanding the unique nature of a capital case, "the State does not
have the responsibility of providing such services to indigents
charged with capital crimes." Id., at 6.

II
In defending the holding of the Court of Appeals, the State
forgoes any justification of the Court of Appeals' constitutional holding. Instead, the State maintains that the constitutional question need not be reached because, in this case,
the petitioner failed to put into serious question the issue of
his sanity at the time of the offense. According to the State,
petitioner's sanity was never in serious question because he
had had no prior history of mental illness, reportedly expressed fear once he learned that the children of the murat issue, the invalidation of one finding of aggravating circumstances did
not require the invalidation of the sentence as a whole so long as at least
one valid finding was available to support the imposition of capital punishment. Under the death penalty statute at issue in Zant, the jury was not
instructed "to balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard." Id., at--. Indeed that statute did not
require the jury to undertake any balancing of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Id., at--. Oklahoma's death penalty statute, by contrast, does require such balancing. It states that "[u]nless at least one of
the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is so found
or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by
the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty
shall not be imposed." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. The reasoning of
Zant, then, does not appear to control this case; if one aggravating circumstance is invalidated on appeal, the death sentence itself must be vacated
even in the presence of other, unchallenged findings of aggravating circumstances. See Zant v. Stephens , supra, at - - (JUSTICE MARSHALL
dissenting).
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dered parents had survived their wounds, and gave a detailed and lucid post-arrest confession. Brief in Opp. 6-8.
The central problem with this analysis is that it wholly ignores the reason the trial court offered as to why it refused to
appoint a psychiatrist to aid the petitioner with his insanity
defense. There is no indication whatsoever that the trial
court's ruling was predicated upon a finding that petitioner
had failed to present a colorable showing of insanity at the
time of the offense. 4 Rather, the trial court rejected petitioner's request for a court-appointed psychiatrist on the
grounds that it lacked statutory authorization to make such
an appointment and that the federal Constitution did not
compel it to satisfy the petitioner's request. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court on these
same grounds. 5 See Ake v. State, 663 P. 2d, at 6. Thus, con'Neither the trial court nor the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
made any inquiry into whether the petitioner could make a colorable showing that he was insane at the time of the offense. They apparently assumed that the petitioner would have no constitutional right to psychiatric
assistance no matter what sort of showing he was capable of making.
That the petitioner succeeded in raising insanity to the status of a colorable issue is indicated by the fact that the jury received an insanity instruction. See Ake v. State, supra, at 10.
Rejecting the claim that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the
evidence that the petitioner was not guilty by reason of insanity, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that the petitioner "failed to establish any reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the time the crimes were committed." Id.
Whether the petitioner established reasonable doubt as to his sanity is a far
different issue, however, than whether the petitioner made enough of a
showing to put his sanity into question. While the former relates to the
final resolution of a claim of insanity, the latter entails a preliminary decision relating to whether a defendant has made an initial showing substantial enough to warrant the appointment of a psychiatrist.
· The Oklahoma Court of Appeals also held that the petitioner's claim
had not been properly preserved in the motion for a new trial and that it
had thus been waived. Ibid. Assuming that the petitioner failed to satisfy Oklahoma's procedural requirements for preserving claims on appeal,
this Court can still properly exercise jurisdiction over this case because the
Oklahoma Courtof Appeals' ruled on the merits of petitioner's constitu-
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trary to the State's suggestion, this Court must indeed reach
the federal constitutional issue in order properly to adjudicate this case.
The issue presented by this case is whether, under any circumstances, a defendant has a federal constitutional right to
the services of a psychiatrist for the purpose of preparing a
defense to a criminal prosecution in a state court. The Court
granted certiorari to consider this question in Bush v. Texas,
372 U. S. 586 (1963). In Bush an indigent defendant who
had previously been adjudicated insane was charged and convicted of theft. At trial, the defendant pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity and requested that the court either send
him to a state medical institution for observation and diagnosis or appoint and pay for a psychiatrist for this purpose.
The trial judge rejected this request, noting that the court
"had no fund or money for so-called psychiatrists, alienists,
quacks or specialists." Brief for Petitioner in Bush v..
Texas, 0. T. 1962, No. 511, p. 3. This Court declined to resolve this issue only because the Assistant Attorney General
of Texas indicated at oral argument that he would seek to
have the defendant retried based upon a post-conviction psychiatric evaluation of the defendant which showed that the
defendant was then mentally ill and that he may have been
mentally ill at the time of the crime. Bush v. Texas, supra,
at 590. 6
tional claim. A ruling on the merits of a federal question by the highest
state court leaves the federal question open to review by this Court. See,
e. g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 161-162 (1978)
6
The trial court evidently believed that United States ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953) decided the issue posed by petitioner for it cited
Baldi for the proposition that "a State does not have a constitutional duty
to provide psychiatric examinations to indigent defendants." App. to Pet.
for Cert. at A-31. Baldi stands for no such proposition. Smith claimed
that his conviction and death sentence was invalid because the State had
deprived him of the assistance of a psychiatrist. The Court rejected the
petitioner's assertion not on the grounds that the federal Constitution did
not compel the provision of a psychiatrist but rather on the grounds that, in
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Equally as significant as the Court's previous willingness
to consider the issue posed by this case, is the history of Bush
subsequent to this Court's remand. In state court, the defendant was found to be sane. A federal district court, however, granted habeas corpus relief to the defendant on the
grounds that the state court had failed to provide the petitioner with an adequate process by which to establish his insanity claim. Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (ND
Tex. 1964), aff'd, 334 F. 2d 672 (CA5 1965). More specifically, the federal district court ruled that the state court had
violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel by refusing, prior to trial, either to commit the defendant
fact, the petitioner had had the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation as to his
sanity at the time of the crime and that that evaluation sufficed to satisfy
the requirements of due process. 344 U. S., at 568.
One sentence in Baldi, if quoted out of context, seems to support the interpretation of the holding urged by respondent. In that sentence, the
Court remarked that a State does not have the duty by federal constitutional mandate to appoint a psychiatrist to make a pretrial examination.
Ibid. What the Court clearly meant was that a State was under no constitutional compulsion to provide a defendant with psychiatric assistance
once a court-appointed psychiatrist had examined the defendant as to his
sanity at the time of the crime and presented to the jury his expert opinion
on the issue. Because the defendant had had the benefit of at least some
expert testimony regarding his alleged insanity at the time of the offense,
the Court found that the requirements of due process were satisfied. In
the words of the Court, "the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard by the
trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suffices." Id. Here, by contrast, no psychiatrist testified as to the petitioner's sanity at the time of
the offense.
Apart from being readily distinguishable on the facts, Baldi offers little
precedential value with respect to the legal issues at stake here because it
predates this Court's enlargement of the affirmative duty of the states to
provide to indigent defendants the legal tools necesary for a fair trial.
Among the landmark decisions that postdate Baldi and erode the proposition for which the the trial court cited it are Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12
(1956) (constitutional right to transcript for appeal as ofright from criminal
conviction), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (constitutional
right to counsel in felony trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963)
(constitutional right to counsel for direct appeal).
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to a state facility for examination or to appoint a psychiatrist
to examine him. The federal district court justified its ruling by observing that "the right to counsel is meaningless if
the lawyer is unable to make an effective defense because he
has no funds to provide the specialized testimony which the
case requires." Id., at 565. 7 Other courts have indicated
support for the analysis suggested by Bush, especially in the
context of a capital case. See, e. g., Blake v. Zant, 513 F.
Supp. 772, 787 (SD Ga. 1981) (habeas corpus relief granted
because "in a capital case, a defendant whose sanity at the
time of the alleged crime is fairly in question , has at a minimum the constitutional right to at least one psychiatric
examination at state expense.") (emphasis in original). 8
' The Sixth Amendment guarantees, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions , the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of counsel." The Court has long recognized, however, that
this right is vitiated when the circumstances surrounding the appointment
of counsel deny a defendant "effective and substantial aid." Alabama v.
Powell, 287 U. S. 45, 53 (1932). See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U. S. 475, 489-490 (1978); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446 (1940).
Similarly, this Court has prohibited government conduct that would render
ineffective an attorney's assistance to a defendant. See, e.g., Moore v.
Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977); Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976);
United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967).
8
See also Hintz v. Beto, 379 F. 2d 937, 941-943 (CA5 1967); Jacobs v.
United States, 350 F. 2d 571, 573 (CA41965); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F. 2d 691, 695-696 (CA7 1965), aff'd in part and remanded
in part on other grounds 383 U. S. 375. But see Watson v. Patterson, 358
F. 2d 297 (CAlO), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 876 (1966); United States ex rel.
Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489, 492-493(ND Ga. 1971); Houghtaling
v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 163 S. E. 2d 560, 562 (1968) cert. denied
394 U. S. 1021 (1969). A useful listing of relevant cases is contained in
Weeks, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State by
Appointment of Investigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970 & 1983
Supp.).
For commentary urging the recognition of a constitutional right, under
certain conditions, to psychiatric assistance see Goldstein and Fine, The
Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1061 (1962); Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to
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Congress recognized the imperative need to provide indigents with access to experts by enacting 18 U. S. C.
§ 3006A(e). Section 3006A(e) entitles a defendant in a federal criminal trial to obtain the service of experts, including
psychiatrists, if he cannot otherwise afford such services and
if the psychiatrists assistance is "necessary for an adequate
defense." 9 Similar statutes have been enacted by at least
forty states. 10 What these federal and state statutes reflect
is a widespread recognition that when an indigent defendant
asserts a colorable insanity defense, it is fundamentally unfair to try him without providing him with at least some minimal degree of assistance in presenting his defense through
expert testimony by a psychiatrist. 11
It is difficult to imagine a case where expert testimony is as
essential to a constitutionally adequate trial as where a defendant, facing a possible death sentence, pleads not guilty
by reason of insanity. An extraordinary amount of attention
Independent Psychiatrist, 7 Tulsa L. Rev. 137 (1971); Note, The Indigent's
Right to An Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in
Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 632 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in
Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn. L. Rev.
1054 (1963).
9
18 U. S. C. § 3006A(e)(l) provides in pertinent part that counsel for a
defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry that in an ex
parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is
financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. The compensation is generally limited to $300 plus reimbursement for expenses. Id. (3).
10
See statutes cited in Recent Developments,-Equal Protection-Refusal to Provide Expert Witness for Indigent Defendant Denies Equal Protection, 59 Wash. U.L. Quart. 317, 321 n. 18 (1981). See also A.
Moenssens & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 10 n. 19
(1978).
11
See American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed.
1982): "The quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet
valueless to the defendant if the defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist ... and no such services are available." Id. , at 5.20.
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has been dedicated to establishing the standard by which to
define insanity, but the most important factor in determining
whether a standard-whatever its content-is correctly applied to a particular individual "is whether the accused has a
psychiatrist at all to aid him in making his defense."
Goldstein and Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist,
and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1061, 1061
(1962) For good or for ill, psychiatrists have become key figures in the criminal adversarial process; the conclusions they
draw from their arcane science significantly influence both
findings of guilt or innocence and determinations of appropriate punishment. 12 The mantle of presumed expertise with
which our society has cloaked the views of psychiatrists
makes access to their opinion and testimony essential in a
trial where insanity is the central issue. 13 Deprived of access
2
' "The opinion of psychiatrists can have substantial or decisive influence
in the determination of whether a defendant is fit to stand trial, whether he
is responsible for a crime, and whether he is to be executed or given a life
sentence." Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and
Correction, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 650, 650 (1958). See also J.
Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry (1980); Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev.
527 (1978); Slovenko, The Insanity Defense in the Wake of the Hinkley
Trial, 14 Rutgers L. J. 373 (1983); Slovenko, Reflections on the Criticisms
of Psychiatric Expert Testimony, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 37 (1978).
In recent years there have been a number of highly-publicized cases in
which psychiatric assistance to the defense reportedly proved of decisive
importance in obtaining verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. See,
e. g., Taylor, Too Much Justice, Harper's 56 (Sept. 1982) (reporting on the
acquittal by reason of insanity of John W. Hinckley, Jr., accused of having
attempted to assassinate the President of the United States)
13
Commenting on the powerful influence of psychiatric testimony, JusTICE BLACKMUN recently observed that in the sentencing phase of a capital
case the testimony of the state's psychiatrist, "colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's
words, equates with death itself." Barefoot v. Estelle, - - U. S. - -,
- - (1983) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissenting).
Commentators have noted the frequently exaggerated influence that expert psychiatric testimony exerts not only over juries but over lawyers as
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to the services a psychiatrist offers, a defense attorney asserting an insanity defense is ineffectual. 14
When a defendant, because of indigency, is forced to forgo
the services of a psychiatrist, the balance of advantage between the accused and the prosecution tilts decisively and unfairly in favor of the latter. This is especially true where, as
here, the prosecution repeatedly calls to the jury's attention
the lack of a psychiatrist's opinion as to the sanity of the defendant at the time of the crime. 15 The unfairness is heightened still further where the state uses its psychiatrist to establish an aggravating circumstance in the capital sentencing
trial of a defendant. 16 Here, the state prosecutor used the
judges as well. See, e. g., Morse, supra, n. 12, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. at
535-536 ("Much of the legal doctrine and operation of the mental health
legal system depends on the assumptions and learning of mental health science. Most lawyers regard mental disorders as arcane and disturbing
phenomena that are beyond their comprehension and are understood by
Lawyers therefore tend to defer
only a few highly trained experts . . .
to mental health experts, and mental health law decisions at all levels, especially if the proceedings are not truly adversary, are often based more on
psychiatric reasoning and conclusions than on legal reasoning.") (footnotes
omitted).
""[It] is a matter of common knowledge, that upon the trial of certain
issues, such as insanity . . . experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense. . . [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage if
he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts
of those against him." Reilly v. Barry, 250 N. Y. 456,461, 166 N. E. 165,
167 (1929) (Cardozo, C. J.).
16
For example, the following colloquy resulted from the State prosecutor's questioning of one of the psychiatrists who examined the petitioner as
to his competency to stand trial:
"Q. Is there any place, in any report you have ever seen, or anything you
have had the benefit to review, that has said this defendant was legally insane in October or November of 1979 [the time when the offense was
committed]?"
"A. No, sir."
"Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether-"
"A. No, sir." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45.
See also App to Pet. for Cert. A-34, A-36, A-49, A-51.
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testimony of a psychiatrist to establish the petitioner's "future dangerousness." 11 By contrast, the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to develop expert testimony which
might have provided a persuasive rebuttal. That the state
saw fit to use its own psychiatrist in the prosecution of the
defendant is a strong indication that, in the circumstances of
this case, the services of a psychiatrist was not a mere luxury
but a pressing necessity. 18
In two recent decisions, this Court has recognized the need
for an attorney to be aided by a psychiatrist in the preparation of a case where insanity is the asserted defense. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), the Court held that the
Fifth Amendment prohibited the admission into evidence,
over the defendant's objection, of statements obtained by a
state psychiatrist in pretrial interviews in which the defendant was not warned that his responses might be used against
him. The Court suggested, however, that where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, he must be
"Securing the services of experts to examine evidence, to advise counsel, and to rebut the prosecution's case is probably the single most critical
factor in defending a case in which novel scientific evidence is introduced."
Gianelli, The Admissability of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Col. L. Rev. 1198, 1243 (1980). There
are, however, widespread disparities between the State's ability to obtain
the assistance of experts and the ability of defendants, especially, indigent
defendants to obtain such assistance. Id. at 1244-1245 ("The underlying
problem is that the 'burden of rebuttal is generally borne ... by defendants without the economic means to marshall scientific witnesses for the
battle of the experts.'" (citation omitted)).
17
See App. to Pet for Cert. A-50, A-64, A-65.
,a Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., at 344 ("Lawyers to prosecute
are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers thay can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.'')
16
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deemed to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in order to allow the State's psychiatrist to examine him; otherwise, a defendant could deprive the State of
"the only effective means" it has of controverting his claim of
insanity. Id., at 465. This suggestion indicates how, in certain contexts, the Court clearly perceives that psychiatric assistance is crucial to the proper functioning of the adversary
process. This perception should have pushed the Court to
grant certiorari in this case. After all, if the State's only effective means of controverting a defendant's insanity defense
is through examination of the defendant by the State's psychiatrists, it stands to reason that a defendant's only effective
means of establishing an insanity defense will also necessarily
entail the aid of a psychiatrist.
Barefoot v. Estelle, - - U. S. - - (1983), evinces a similar acknowledgement that psychiatric assistance on both
sides is required for the proper functioning of the adversary
process where sanity is at issue. In Barefoot the Court upheld the practice of admitting into evidence expert psychiatric testimony regarding the future dangerousness of defendants. It stated that "[i]f the jury may make up its mind
about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric
testmony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the
views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views
of the defendant's doctors." Id., at - - (emphasis added).
The Court noted that in Barefoot no evidence was offered at
trial to contradict the testimony of the State's psychiatrists.
The Court declared, however, that this lack of expert assistance on behalf of the defendant did not undermine the legitimacy of the conviction because there had been no indication
that, despite the defendant's indigency, the trial court had
refused to provide the defendant with an expert. Id., at n.
5. Here the trial court did refuse to provide an expert. At
another point in the opinion, the Court stated that one reason
why it would allow psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness to be admitted into evidence is that the adversary
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system will be competent to uncover, recognize and take due
account of any shortcomings in such testimony. Id., at--.
If, however, the defendant lacks access to a psychiatrist, his
ability to uncover weaknesses will be hampered, the adversary process will be distorted, and the special carefulness required of adjudication in capital cases will be compromised.
Two other factors further underline the fundamental unfairness which has tainted the judicial proceedings against
this petitioner. First, Ake requested the assistance of a
psychiatrist not at post-conviction proceedings but rather at
trial where the State's purpose "is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600,
610 (1974). The Court has recognized that it is precisely at
this stage, where a presumptively innocent defendant is attempting to ward off the State's accusations of criminality,
that his claim to state-sponsored assistance in erecting a defense is most compelling. Ibid.
Second, this case arises from a State's attempt to condemn
a man to death. In a wide variety of contexts, this Court has
recognized that the unique character of a capital trial requires that it be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of
factfinding. 19 It has thus been noted that "[w]hat is essential
[in the sentencing phase of a capital case] is that the jury
19
As I noted in Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, a t - , this Court has time
and again condemned procedures in capital cases that might be acceptable
in ordinary cases. For example, long before this Court recognized the right
to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, it established
that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, supra. Other instances in
which this Court has required more stringent procedural standards in the
context of a capital trial include the circumstances under which the Double
Jeopardy Clause can be invoked, Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430
(1981); the circumstances under which a judge must instruct a jury as to
lesser included offenses, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); and the
circumstances under which a trial judge must be allowed to consider mitigating evidence, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978).
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have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion). Here,
however, despite the petitioner's plea that he was insane at
the time of the crime, the State has condemned him to death
without the benefit of any expert opinion regarding his insanity claim. Moreover, as to the issue of the petitioner's future
dangerousness, the only expert opinion offered was that of
the State's psychiatrists. Such one-sidedness made a mockery of the adversary system and tainted the proceedings
against the petitioner with the sort of egregious unfairness
which violates the federal constitutional guarantee of Due
Process.
Closely related to Ake's claim that he was denied Due
Process is his claim that he was denied Equal Protection of
the laws. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 19 (1956). Yet this case
presents in extreme fashion the spectacle of indigency subverting our pious allegiance to "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW." Had the petitioner been a man of means, he would
undoubtedly have obtained the services of a psychiatrist.
As an indigent, however, petitioner was left bereft of any access to the specialized knowledge necessary to an insanity defense. This squalid distinction between the justice afforded
a person of means asserting an insanity defense and an indigent asserting an insanity defense offends the notion of
equality that is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whenever the Fourteenth Amendment is read to impose
upon the States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps
flowing from differences in economic circumstances," 20 certain objections are invariably raised. The most important of
these objections is that the equality principle articulated in
Griffin goes too far and knows no stable limits: "Once loosed,
20

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 34 gustice Harlan dissenting).
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the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1966).
Distinguished Justices of this
Court have warned that there is simply no way consistently
to administer application of the Griffin principle since a thoroughgoing implementation of it would require a level of judicial intervention which would be antithetical to other constitutional values and far outside the institutional capabilities
of this Court. 21
But in applying the Griffin principle, this
Court has always been aware of these difficulties and has implemented this principle with a necessary respect for
practicalities: "Absolute equality is not required; lines can be
drawn and are drawn and we often sustain them." Douglas
v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357 (1963). 22
Justice Harlan was perhaps the most articulate critic of the position I
assert. See, e.g., Id., at 29-39; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S., at
360--367 (dissenting opinion); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40, 43-44
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
22
A useful general response to the fears expressed by Justice Harlan was
set forth in R eport of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and
the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963):
"[G]overnmental obligation to deal effectively with problems of poverty in
the administration of criminal justice ... does not presuppose a general
commitment . .. to relieve impoverished persons of the consequences of
limited means, whenever or however manifested.
The obligation of government in the criminal cases rests on wholly different considerations and reflects principles of much more limited application.
The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which this Report
is concerned arise in a process initiated by government for the achievement of basic governmental purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has
as one of its consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the persons proceeded against. . . . When government chooses to exert its powers in the criminal area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking
reasonable measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just
administration of the law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While government
may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may properly
be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of
justice." Id. , at 9.
21
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In this case, two factors serve as reliable lines within which
to circumscribe application of the Griffin principle. The first
involves the nature of the assistance the petitioner sought
from the State. The petitioner sought assistance from the
State that was essential to effective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, even if the psychiatric assistance the petitioner
sought is not deemed a requirement under the Due Process
Clause, it is nonetheless of sufficient importance in the administration of a criminal trial that it cannot be withheld from
a defendant, solely on account of his indigency, without violating the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, it would be
absurd to require that an indigent be furnished with "every
possible legal tool, no matter how speculative its value, and
no matter how devoid of assistance it may be, merely because
a person of unlimited means might choose to waste his resources in a quest of that kind." United States v.
MacCollom, 426 u. s. 317, 330 (1976) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN
concurring) (emphasis added). What the Griffin principle
does require, however, is that "the State must, as a matter of
equal protection, provide indigent [defendants] with the
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal when those tools
are available for a price to other [defendants]." Britt v.
North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226, 227 (1971) (emphasis added).
Griffin does not mandate a utopian quest for absolute equality with respect to every aspect of the adversary process, but
it does mandate substantial equality with respect to important features of that process. Psychiatric assistance in a
capital case in which the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity clearly qualifies as a feature of the adversary
process important enough to trigger the protection of the
Equal Protection Clause. 23
:
28

In Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, the Court decided that a psychiatrist's
prediction of a defendant's future dangerousness is properly admissible because of the ability of the adversarial process to ferret out unreliable testimony. JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted in dissent that "the Court's reasoning
suggests that, were a defendant to show that he was unable, for financial

;

18
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The second limiting feature of this case involves the nature
of the proceeding against the petitioner: he was on trial for
his life. Because the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake, there is a corresponding
need in that context to be especially intolerant of arrangements that make the quality of justice a defendant obtains a
mere reflection of his position in our society's socio-economic
hierarchy. Thus, at least with respect to capital cases, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that states provide defendants asserting a colorable insanity defense with reasonable
access to expert psychiatric assistance.
Because it is probable that the ruling of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals violates the petitioner's federal
constitutional rights and because the petitioner has posed important federal constitutional issues about which there is
much disagreement among state and federal courts, I dissent
from the Court's denial of certiorari.

or other reasons, to obtain an adequate rebuttal expert, a constitutional
violation might be found." U. S. a t - , n. 12. This case presents
the very issue that JUSTICE BLACKMUN anticipated, at least with respect
to petitioner's inability to obtain a psychiatrist at the sentencing phase of
his trial.
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83-542 r

This is a brief memo, after a preliminary look at the
briefs, to refresh my memory.
This

is

a

convicted

of

the

wife,

and

to

sentenced

to

in

which

murders

attempted
death.

rape
No

of

minister

the

of

two

one).

question

is

petitioner

was

and his

children

(in

Petitioner

was

raised

as

to

his

His only defense was insanity at the time of the

crimes.

The

defendant
crime,

case

inhuman murders of a

attempted

addition

guilt.

capital

principle

whose

has

a

defense

question
is

is

whether

insanity at

constitutional

right

an

indigent

the

time of his

to

psychiatric

examination and assistance in support of his defense?
;

There are a couple of other questions

in the case.

One that is important relates to the second phase at which
counsel from the state relied on "future dangerousness" as
an aggravating factor,
psychiatric

testimony

and supported that by reliance on
of

state

psychiatrists.

These

psychiatrists had examined the defendant only to determine

whether

he

solely on
the

was

fit

these

state's

mentally

to

examinations,

stand

these

supported

witnesses

argument.

"dangerousness"

Relying

trial.

defendant

The

previously had been placed in a mental institution on the
basis

of

examination

by

these

psychiatrists.

After

treatment there, they concluded he was fit to stand trial.
Framed

as

a

psychiatric

separate

question,

the

assistance provided by

the

right
state

to

have

is claimed

both for the guilt and sentencing stages of a capital case
trial.
My recollection is that I voted to deny cert in this
case primarily because the Oklahoma Court of Appeals found
that the defendant had waived his constitutional claim by
not raising

I

it at trial.

thought this was not a good

case to address the constitutional issue at least until we
had

the

benefit

of

a

federal

court's

view

on

haebous

corpus.
,

I

am

now

Appointed

counsel

repeatedly
expense,

persuaded
for

requested
a

the

that

psychiatrist

that

there

defendant
the

to

state
examine

was

no

explicitly
provide,
and

~

waivet.
and

at

its

assist

the

defendant with respect to his defense that he was insane
at

the

time

of

the

murders.

Counsel

argued

that

an

indigent was as entitled to this sort of expert assistance
as to a defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
There are a
them all.

number

of briefs,

and

I

have not read

I have taken a look - though a preliminary one

- at the briefs of the parties.
Of those that I have read, the best and most helfful
brief is filed by my former law clerk Joel Kline on behalf
of

the

somewhat

American
similar

Psychiatric
brief

filed

Psychological Association.

Association.
on

behalf

of

There
The

is

a

American

The National League of Aid and

Defense Association also has filed a brief supporting the
claimed constitutional right.
I am tentatively

inclined

to think

that there

is a

constitutional to have the assistance of competent medical
advice where the defense is insanity at the time the crime
is committed.

LFP, JR.

;

;

alb

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

October 24, 1984

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Lee

No. 83-5424, Ake v.

~~~ ·QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Does the Griffin-Douglas principle require a state court

to appoint a psychiatrist to assist an indigent defendant who
raises the insanity defense?
II.

In

a

testimony

capital
to

case,

if

the

state

establish

an

indigent

relies

upon

defendant's

expert
"future

dangerousness," must he be provided a psychiatrist to assist
him in rebutting this claim?

III.

was

the

trial

judge

required

to

order

a

competency

hearing when the heavily medicated defendant refused to talk
to his attorney at trial and appeared unconcerned with the
proceedings against him?

BACKGROUND

On
drove a

October

15,

borrowed car

1979,

petitioner

to the home of Rev.

Douglass, near Kingfisher, Oklahoma.

and

Steven

and Mrs.

Hatch

Richard

They gained entrance to

the home under the pretense of making a phone call, and then
forced

the

entire

Douglass

family

into

the

living

room.

Reverend Douglass, his wife, and their sixteen year old son
were

bound

and

gagged

on

the

living

room

floor.

After

petitioner failed in several attempts to rape the Douglasses'
twelve year old daughter,

she was bound and placed with the

rest of her

two men ransacked

family.

The

took some valuables and cash.
the

car,

petitioner

shot all

family in the back with a

Then,
four

the house,

and

while Hatch waited

members of

.357 magnum pistol.

in

the Douglass
Reverend and

Mrs. Douglass died; the two children survived.
About
Colorado.

one month

later,

petitioner

was

arrested

The evidence of his guilt was overwhelming.

in
His

fingerprints were found in the Douglasses' home, and he had
used

their

Following

his

credit

cards

extradition,

to

finance

petitioner

extensive
was

travels.

identified

in

a

line-up

by

the

Douglass

After

children.

his

arrest,

petitioner gave the police a detailed confession.
'=
--....
On February 14, 1980, petitioner was

arraigned

before

Oklahoma.

the

district

--

court

of

Canadian

County,

Ake's behavior at the arraignment was "so bizarre" that the
court

sua

sponte

ordered

a

psychiatric

examination.

Dr.

diagnosed Ake as a paranoid schizophrenic, and
"more prolonged psychiatric examination."

The

district court subsequently ordered petitioner committed to
the Eastern State Hospital

in Vinita,

Oklahoma,

so that he

could be examined with respect to his "present sanity."
On
___,

i~

April

1,

1980,

a

special

hearing

was

held

to / ~

determine petitioner's competency to stand trial. ~
lh'~ from

the

state

hospital,

testified

that

petitioner

was

J),A1_V". -parnoid schizophrenic unable to under stand fully what
r.
going on around him. Dr. Allen testified that petitioner
11

a

was

~~

I\

a

"dangerous

psychotic"

who could

between right and wrong.
district
person

-

judge

'-

in

found

At

that

not

tell

difference

the close of the hearing,

petitioner

was

"mentally

a

the
i11

need

all

Stat. Tit. 22
Six

of

care

criminal
§

and

treatment"

and

proceedings

were

ordered

him

Pursuant to state
Okla.

suspended.

1171 (1971).

weeks

later,

the

Chief

Forensic

~

Psychiatrist
that

b

.
;

recommitted to the state mental hospital.
statute,

the

was

reported

at

the

state

petitioner

had

become

psychiatrist

noted

,......,

that

competent

the

,,..,

to

petitioner

stand
was

to

the

court

trial.
given

The
a

200

C

,.

milligram dose of Thorazine three times each day.

The doctor

stated if this treatment were continued, Ake would be able to
assist his attorney in trial preparations.
Dr.

Garcia's

report,

the

district

On the basis of

court

the

ordered

~

resumption of criminal proceedings against Ake.
A pretrial

conference was

held

on

June

13,

t)-c:_

1980.

The petitioner's court-appointed attorney informed the judge
that

he

needed

preparation.

the

assistance of

a

psychiatrist

for

trial

The attorney planned to rely upon the insanity

defense, which requires a showing that the defendant did not
know the difference between right and wrong at the time he
committed the criminal act, and none of the psychiatrist who
-.._/

~

II{(' ro---rv

~~
~~

( had examined Ake had attempted to determine his mental state
( at the

µJ, ~

tfV'

Although

the defense attorney

argued that the appointment of a psychiatrist was mandated by
the

federal

constitution,

the

district

judge

denied

the

motion on the basis of United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,

~ 344

~l,.AIJ

time of the murders.

U.S. 561 (1953).

held

that

rovide

a

state

private

According to the judge, the Baldi Court ~
"does not have
psychiatric

a constitutional duty to

examination

to

indigent~

~~~

defendants."
Petitioner's
1980.

two

day

trial

commenced

on

June

24,

The only significant issue was petitioner's ~ t y at

the time of the murders.
Dr.

Allen,

~

Dr.

Garcia,

The defense called three witnesses:
and

Dr.

Enos.

~ 11 three ) testified

that petitioner suffered from schizophrenia of the paranoid
type, and that during psychotic episodes, he saw himself as a

5""~
~
~

"sword

of

On

vengeance."

-

cross-examination,

-------~ -

each

--

doctor

-

explained that he had not evaluated Ake with respect to his

~

mental state at the time of the crimes, and therefore could
express

no

valid

medical

opinion

on

that

question.

This

crucial deficiency was stressed repeatedly by the prosecutor
during his closing argument.
The jury rejected petitioner's insanity defense, and
found Ake guilty of two counts of first degree murder, and
two

counts

of

shooting

with

intent

to

kill.

At

the

sentencing phase, the prosecutor argued that petitioner would
pose a "continuing threat to society," an aggravating factor
under

the

Oklahoma

death

penalty

Although

statute.

the

proscutor did not present any additional evidence, he asked
the

jury

to

consider

the

"guilt-phase"

Garcia, a defense witness.
examination
er imes

that

of

Dr.

Dr. Garcia had stated on cross-

petitioner

in the future.

testimony

was

likely

to

commit

violent

The defense lawyer presented no new

evidence to rebut this testimony.
The

---

jury

sentenced

Ake

to death.

aggravating factors, including ~
The

Oklahoma

Court

of

It

re dangerousn~
Criminal

-

found

Appeals

three
;

~
affirmed

Ake's convictions and the imposition of the death sentence.
The

court

held

that

the

state

was

not

required

by

the

constitution to provide an indigent defendant with a courtappointed
refusal
violate

psychiatrist.

to grant
his

the

right

Therefore,

the

district

court's

petitioner's pretrial motion did
to

effective

assistance

of

not

counsel.

6.

Furthermore,

the

appellate

court

held

that

this

claim was

waived because it had not been preserved in the motion for a
new trial.
Ake further argued that the Thorazine treatment he
received

made

object of

him

unable

to understand

the proceedings against him.

the

nature and

While acknowledging

-------

----

that petitioner had remained mute throughout the trial,
....

appellate

court

rejected

the

petitioner's

incompetency

the

claim.

The court noted that the medication had not been administered
solely

to

progress
but

render
of

Ake

criminal

instead

to

"sufficiently
proceedings

"normalize"

tranquil

instituted

him.

The

Court

to

facilitate

against
of

him,"

Criminal

Appeals stated that if a defendant is "rendered competent to
assist in his defense through the use of medication, it is in
the best interests of justice to afford him a speedy trial."

.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. An Indigent's Right to a Psychiatric Examination
Petitioner contends
were

violated

psychiatrist.

-~

by

the

trial

that his constitutional rights
court's

refusal

to

appoint

a

The Court of Criminal Appeals found, however,

that this claim was waived because it was "not preserved in
the motion for
Oklahoma

that

a new trial."
an

It is a well-settled rule in

argument cannot be made on appeal

unless

/~~
preserved by a motion for a new trial.
617

P.2d

588

This

(Okl.Cr.1980).

See Irvin v.

procedural

State,

requirement

cannot be viewed either as an attempt by the state court to
evade petitioner's vindication of federal rights, or as the
type of rule that generally discriminates against the raising
of

federal

~~£t;;;::I

claims.

Therefore,

1

because

the

judgment below

rests on independent and adequate state grounds,

this Court

1

should not consider petitioner's claim.

If the Court decides to reach the question raised by
petitioner,

court's

th/ .ower

In Griffin v.

reversed.

judgment

Illinois,

u. s.

351

should

probably
12

(1955),

be
the

Court held that the state could not deny a trial transcript
/

o

indigent

Douglas

er iminal

v.

defendants

California,

invalidated

a

make

preliminary

some

statute

appointment of
the

Court

372

that

u.s.

appellate counsel.

used

the

Equal

353

required

showing

Similarly,

appeal.

on

(1963),

the

Court

indigent defendants

of

merit

prior

In both of

Protection

Clause

in

to

to
the

these cases,
and

the

Due

Process Clause to ensure that the "type of trial that a man
gets [does not) depend[) on the amount of money that he has."
Griffin,

351

U.S.

at 19.

Applying Griffin and

Douglas

to

1 In Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), this Court held
~ ~
that it was not barred from considering a judgment resting on
'-j'
independent and adequate state procedural grounds if the rule in ~
question did not "serve a legitimate state interest." The
~
Oklahoma rule certainly serves a "legitimate state interest."
/A
For obvious reasons, the state wo4ld prefer to have a trial
/L-'<...,
judge, when possible, correct his own errors by granting a new
~
trial.
~

j

~~
~I

8.

this

case

suggests

psychiatric

that petitioner was entitled

examination

of

his

sanity

at

to have a

the

time

he

committed his crime.
In Ross v. Moffitt,v:;17 U.S.

600

(1974), the Court

limited the reach of the Griffin-Douglas rationale by holding
that

the

state

discretionary
acheiving

was

not

appeals.

the

required

to

Recognizing

absolute

equality

appoint
the

that

counsel

for

impossibility

the

of

Griffin-Douglas

principle, carried to its logical extreme, would require, the
Court

held

defendants

that
with

the
"an

state

adequate

need

only

provide

opportunity

to

claims fairly within the adversary system."
Court

reasoned,

defendant

who

no

had

basis

been

for

thinking

represented

by

present

their

There was,

that
an

indigent

an

the

indigent

attorney on

his

first appeal could not adequately present his claims to the
state supreme court.
present"

his

In contrast, an_ indig_.ant crnot "~lya / '~

insanity

defense

psychiatric examination. 2
all

lower

courts

have

without

having

had

Indeed, it appears that virtually ' :~

held

that

a

er iminal

defendant

entitled to at least one psychiatric examination.

is

See,e.g.,

2 In Oklahoma, a lay witness may give his opinion of the
defendant's sanity. High v. State, 401 P.2d 189 (Okla.Cr. 1965).
The effectiveness of these lay witnesses is questionable,
however. Even if a layman can recognize the signs of cognitive
or emotional disturbance, professional training or experience
often may be required to elicit more detailed information. A.
Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 25-26 (1967).
More importantly,
the psychiatrist may be needed to provide a framework for
otherwise unrelated pieces of information.

Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1983)
The
States

ex

Oklahoma

rel.

court

Smith

v.

upon

United

(1953),

Baldi

in

deciding that an indigent defendant need not be provided with
a

psychiatric

examination.

In

Baldi,

the

defendant

convicted of first degree murder on a guilty plea.

was

After the

plea, but before final adjudication and sentencing, the court
heard

testimony

on

the

defendant's

sanity

from

a

court-

appointed

psychiatrist and

defense.

The defendant argued before the Supreme Court that

the

denial

of

his

two psychiatrists called by

request

for

pre-trial

the

psychiatric

assistance had resulted in inadequate assistance of counsel.
The Court held, however, that the state had no constitutional
duty

to provide

psychiatric

assistance.

Id.

at

568.

The

Court reasoned that it was sufficient that the issue of the
defendant's sanity had been heard by the trial court and that
psychiatrists had testified.

Therefore, Baldi is inapposite

in this case because none of the psychiatrists called by Ake
were able to testify about his sanity when he committed the
crimes.
Because no psychiatrist evaluated Ake with respect
to

his

sanity

during

the

murders,

--~~~~~~~~~~------------

Oklahoma

court could

Nevertheless,

be

the

judgment

reversed without overruling

since Baldi

----

does

defendant,

not

appoint

a

the

Baldi.

_.,.

is inconsistent with the Griffin-

Douglas principle, it should be explicitly overruled.
court

of

psychiatric expert

If the

to assist

the

"the type of trial that a man gets depends on the

.

•..

a_.~~~

/

L'-'

~~.__,__

amount

of

money

he

notwithstanding

more

Griffin-Douglas

does

This

has."
recent
not

result

is

decisions

require

impermissible

~

recognizing

absolute

equality.

A

neutral, court-appointed psychiatrist is not under obligation
to help the defendant prepare for trial, and is required to
assist the government as much as the defendant.

Thus, it is

doubtful that one examination by a neutral psychiatrist will
provide an indigent with "an adequate opportunity to present
[his)
v.

claims fairly within the adversary system."

Moffett,.

examination

Therefore,
by

requirements

of

a

the

providing

neutral
Due

expert
Process

the

See
- -Ross
--

defendant

cannot
Clause

with

satisfy
and

the

an
the

Equal

Protection Clause. 3
Oklahoma should not be required by the constitution
to

furnish

a

psychiatrist

to every er iminal defendant.

An

accused indigent is entitled to such assistance only if it is
"necessary"
psychiatric

to

his

examination

defense.
is

In

deciding

"necessary,"

the

whether
lower

a

courts

should look to cases interpreting the Criminal Justice Act of

3 An expert may be necessary to evaluate the facts and to help
develop trial strategy.
In many cases, such an evaluation is
essential in making an intelligent decision about whether to
pursue a certain line of defense, or even in deciding whether to
go to trial. D. Danner, Expert Witness Checklists 72 (1983).
Moreover, the expert can help the attorney prepare for trial by
advising him about facts and theories that may be developed by
the other side.
Most of the lower courts have held that an examination
by neutral expert!§ sufficient. See,e.g., Finney v. Zant, 709 ~
F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1983). Their decisions obviously are
...d. :.A~
constrained by Baldi. See id. at 645.
~,~

~t

>I

~

1--,__ ~

~)v

'~

u.s.c.

18

1964.

psychiatric
defense"

expert

is

is

F.Supp

560

"seriously an
(N.D.Tex.

Here,

diagnosed

as

after

held

"reasonably necessary

issue.

1964),

obviously

aff'd,

Ake's

sanity

the defendant's

F.2d
at

a

McColl um,
672

the

231

(5th Cir.

time

of

the

The petitioner was first

schizophrenic

in

the

Generally

murders.

if

344

that

to an adequate

See Bush v.

11

killings was "seriously an issue."

months

have

within the meaning of the CJA,

sanity

J.965) •

Courts

§3006A(e).

February

1980,

accepted

about

four

diagnostic

criteria for schizophrenia require a finding that the patient
ha·s

shown

signs

of

the

illness

for

at

least

six

months.

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of mental Disorders

(3d ed.)

at 189.

Therefore, the ~

____________________ .

appointment of a psychiatric expert was

__.
"necessary"

in this ~

the

court's

case. 4
it
failure

a

constitutional rights.
his retrial,

appears

that

psychiatrist

trial
violated

Ake's

In providing Ake with an expert for

the state should have the same flexibility that

4without expert testimony, it is very difficult to show that
sanity is "seriously an issue." Therefore, some judges have
suggested lowering the burden placed on defense counsel.
In
United States v. Theirault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.
1971) (Wisdom,J.,concurring), for example, Judge Wisdom stated
that the trial court should rely on the judgment of the defense
attorney if the latter makes a reasonable request.
Although it
is wise to keep in mind the difficulty of establishing
"necessity," I do not think that the liberality which Judge
Wisdom suggests is appropriate under the CJA should become a
constitutional standard.

1'

it has in providing indigent defendants with counsel.

Ake is

.ae-l\

not entitled to the psychiatrist of his choice, nor does
have a right to "shop around" for a favorable diagnosis.

II. Psychiatric Expert for Defendant at the Sentencing Phase
~etitioner

contends

that

he

was

entitled

to

the

assistance of a psychiatric expert in presenting mitigating
circumstances to the jury.
circumstances

relate

to

Because many potential mitigating
the

defendant's

state

of

mind,

a

psychiatrist probably could have aided the petitioner at the
sentencing phase of the trial.
the

indigent

evidence

capital

Ake contends that permitting

defendant

is meaningless

to

introduce

if he lacks

the

mitigating

funds necessary to

compile the evidence.

The argument is unpersuasive, however.

In

cites,

the

only

advanced here.
1983).
the

case

Westbrook v.

CAll noted

defendant

he

that

himself

the

court

Zant,

friends,

"could

rejected

704 F.2d 1487
relatives,

have

taken

the

claim

(11th Cir.

neighbors,

the

stand

in

and
the

penalty phase of trial and introduced mitigating testimony."
Ake himself had a number of friends and relatives who could
have

been

called

to

testify

as

to

his

state

of

mind.

Although this lay testimony is not sufficient at trial when
an insanity defense is raised, it enables the jury to decide
whether

mitigating circumstances warrant a

penalty of life

imprisonment only.
Petitioner
obligated

to

further

provide

him

contends
with

that

the

the

state

assistance

of

was
a

psychiatrist,

so

that

the

prosecution's

dan erousness" could be rebutted.
ground,

for

no

testimony of
argue

lay

person

dangerousness"

Griffin-Douglas

could

principle

at

is entitled

to

Moreover,

the Court's

reasoning

expert

rebutted

by

on

"future

defense

"future

effectively

the state

intends to

sentencing
that

the

phase,

the

indigent

the

the assistance of a psychiatrist.

----indicates

testimony

If
the

in Barefoot v.

(1983),

5189

refute

suggests

defendant

u.s.L.w.

of

This claim stands on firm

the state's experts.

"future

claim

._._---------------

that

introduction

the

d~nge~ousness,"

psychiatrists,

Estelle,

if

violates

it
the

is

51

of ??
not

capital

defendant's eighth amendment rights.

In Barefoot, the Court

held

psychiatric

that

relating
"would

to

have

evidence

by

the

state

future

could

present

dangerousness

the

benefit

the

opposing

of

only

cross-examination

party."

careful to note that Texas provided

'

because

The

fact-finders
and

Barefoot

funds

for

secure the assistance of psychiatric experts.

testimony

contrary

Court

was

----

indigents to
,....._.,

-----------------___.
required
Oklahoma
was
In
summary,

by

the

constitution to appoint a psychiatrist to aid the defendant
in rebutting the state's claim of future dangerousness. 5

5ordinarily, the state would not be required to appoint a
psychiatrist until the sentencing phase.
In this case, however,
the state brought out the evidence of "future dangerousness" at
the guilt phase. Under these circumstances, the state must
appoint a psychiatrist sooner, in order to facilitate the defense
attorney's cross-examination of the government witness.

1

III. Competency to Stand Trial
The
hearing

trial

violated

Thorazine,

court's

failure

petitioner's

to

order

fourteenth

a

competency

amendment

rights.

the antipsychotic drug administered to defendant,

_____..--,

sometimes causes severe drowsiness and apathy.
behavior

at

trial

present

and

proceedings

suggested

impaired
against

that

his

him

and

these

ability
to

Petitioner's

side
to

consult

effects

were

understand

the

with

his

attorney.

v-The

defense

completely

attorney

incoherent

described
zombie."

Ake

as

Moreover,

a

"totally

the

trial

and
judge

noted that "there was all along a real question as to whether
this

man

had

any

kind

of

mental

capacity."

Under

these

circumstances, Ake's constitutional rights were violated the
trial

court's

failure

to

make

an

inquiry

into

his

competency. 6

SUMMARY

The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Under

the

Griffin-Douglas

principle,

a

state

court

must

appoint a psychiatrist to assist an indigent whose sanity is
"seriously

an

issue."

Moreover,

if

the

state

uses

expert

6 Prior to trial, Ake's counsel withdrew a motion for a trial on
the issue of competency.
The withdrawal of this motion does not
constitute a "waiver." · This Court has recognized that "it is
comtradictory to argue tht a d~f-errdafft may be incompetent and yet
knowingly or intellingently waive his right to have the court
determine his capacity to stand trial." See Pate v. Robinson,
383 u.s. 375, 384 (1966).
~--~-

testimony to show a defendant's
indigent

is

entitled

expert.

Finally,

hearing,

even

the

to

the

trial

II

future dangerousness, 11 the

assistance
judge

must

in the middle of a trial,

of
order

a

psychiatric
a

competency

if it appears that

the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against
him or to assist his attorney.

,. ...

,'

November 2, 1984
AKE4 GINA-POW

TO:

Lee

FROM:

LFP, JR.

RE:

83-5424

Ake v. Oklahoma

Your bench memo is excellent, and I certainly agree
generally with your views.
I would like to know exactly what the federal rule is
with

respect

to

providing

a

us

brief states that this is done by the
the

states.

constitutional

Your

memo

right

to

Petitioners

psychiatrist.

concludes
have

a

and a majority of

that

there

psychiatrist

is

a

appointed

either by the court or selected by defense counsel.
If defense counsel does the choosing, he will do what
lawyers always do
will

support

er iminal)

in selecting

their

client.

"experts":
My

own

Find one who

experience

(not

is that where testimony is by an "expert", one
;

almost always can find what we call a "tame" one.
It would be sensible -

and

for us to hold that the court -

I

hope constitutional -

upon request

in a case

like this one - must appoint a neutral psychiatrist chosen

;

in consul tat ion with counsel for

the prosecution and the

defense.
The next question is whether such a psychiatrist has
a

duty

to

cooperate

with

strategy and otherwise?
be

able

direct

to consult with
examination.

educated

as

examination.

to

what

In
to

defense

Clearly,

counsel

ask

planning

defense counsel should

the psychiatrist,
this

in

process,
state

and plan his

counsel

witnesses

would
on

be

cross-

But I doubt that the "neutral" psychiatrist

should sit beside defense counsel as a partisan at trail.
I would like to know what the federal courts do, but
definitely do not want another long memo.

This case comes

up near the end of next week, so we have plenty of time.

;

,.

alb

3 3c,o~ 4 : 1 - t . . . t - ~ - ~~ ~~~~~~~+-

11/05/84

~~--t,,i-..~<l/!ilk~~
TO: Justice Powell
~ 4 . . . . ~ . ~~~~~
FROM: Lee
;, ,,r_-,ul..,.,, .,:,J;-~
RE: No. 83-54{4"";'°Ake v~ahoma, ' supplement to bench memo

/S~

In the federal courts, psyc~iatrists are appointed for~
indigent defendants pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act (CJA),
which provides in pertinent part as follows:

~

~

Ll-

Counsel for a person who is financially unable to
obtain investigative, expert, or other otb~c services
necessary for an adequate defense may request them in
an ex parte application.
Upon finding, after
appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the
services are necessary and that the person is
financially unable to obtain them, the court .•. shall
authorize counsel to obtain the services.
18 u.s.c. §3006A(e) (1).
In interpreting this Act, most federal
courts have held that the appointed psychiatrist should be a

-----

partisan witness, not an impartial one.
-,

In United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.

1971), the court stated that a psychiatric expert appointed
pursuant to 18 u.s.c. §4244 1

could not serve as a §3006A expert.

The CAS stated that while the §4244 expert is expected to be
"neutral and detached," the §3006 expert "serves a different
role."

The §3006A expert is a "partisan witness" whose

"conclusions need not be reported in advance of trial to the

1 section 4244 concerns the examination to determine if the
defendant"-Ts c9mpetent to stand trial.
The court appoints a
psychitatrist who examines the accused and reports to the court.
Rule 28 authorizes the court to appoint its own expert witness,
wficr 1s expected to be neutral and detached.
He advises both
parties of his findings.
18 u.s.c. §4244.

;

-

,,.

court or to the proscution.

11

CA.4 reached the same conclusion in

United States v. Reason, 549 F.2d 309 (1977), in which the court
stated that §3006A expert affords the indigent accused a
reasonable opportunity to procure the "services of a psychiatrist
f"""

to assist him in his defense."
original).

549 F.2d at 311 (emphasis in

See also United States v. Collins, 525 F.2d 213 (1st

Cir. 1975).
Although the federal courts have held that the indigent
is entitled to a "partisan witness," they uniformly have rejected
the idea that a defendant is entitled to a psychiatrist of his

-

own choosing.

See,e.g., United States v. Lincoln, 542 F.2d 746

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1106 (1976).

The courts have

stated, however, that it is "ordinarily desirable" to appoint the
psychiatrist suggested by the defendant.

See,e.g., United States

v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973).
I think that this is what you wanted to know about the
procedure for the appointment of psychiatric experts in federal
court.
me know.

If it is not, or if you need more information, please let

November 7, 1984
AKE3 GINA-POW

83-5424
1.

Ake v. Okalahoma

Where an indigent defendant relies on insanity at

the time of the crime,
him

with

a

the state is required to provide

psychiatric

examination.

appoint the psychiatrist.
right

to

apppoint,

psychiatrist

should

should

available

be

a

neutral

sentencing
testimony

witness.

phase,
of

its

should

to

See

where

Lee's

as

here

defense

psychiatrist

to

counsel

state

establish

to

He is not to

W

memo.
the

The

consulted.

assist in presenting the defendant's case.
be

court

Defense counsel should have no

but
be

The

2.

At

relied

the
on

defendant's

"future dangerousness", the defendant also is entitled to
have the assistance of a psychiatrist.
3.

If

the question as to anti-psychotic medication

of the defendant

is here,

properly

subject

is

psychotic

the

medications

the ef feet of such medication
of

tend

testimony.

Normally,

to ~- restore

anti-

competency.

Apparently, there can be side effects that interfere with
competency.

I would not reach this question, as the case

should be remanded on the first two issues.

2.

*
Counsel for the state argues that Oklahoma law requires
that an objection made at trial be renewed before the
trial court on a motion for a new trial - thus giving that
court an opportunity to correct any error.
Since no
motion for a new trial was made, it is argued that there
was a procedural default, but the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals addressed the question.

83-5424

AKE v. OKLAHOMA

Argued 11/7/84
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1lu!finghm. ~. <!f. 20ffe~,
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQU IST

Re:

83-5424 - Ake v. Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood:
In due course I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference

.tn:prmu OJirnrl d flrt ~ b .tbtttl'

Jru~ ~. <!f.

2llgi'l~

CHAMISERS OF"

.JUSTICE Wt< . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

December 14, 1984

No. 83-5424
Ake v. Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood,
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

.hprmtt <irourt of tlft ~~ ..tatt.
'1ulfington. J. OJ. 2llc?)}#
CHAMISE:RS 01'

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

December 17, 1984

No. 83-5424, Ake v. Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.

.,.

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

i\tt.prtmt <ijonrl of tltt 'Jnittb .Stait.t'
Jlas1finghm. ~. <q. 2llc?~~
CHAMBERS Of'

December 17, 1984

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

83-5425 - Ake v. Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

'

\

lfp/ss 12/18/84

AKE SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Lee

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 18, 1984

83-5424 Ake v. Oklahoma
I have read Justice Marshall's opinion, and
although it is considerably overwritten both in length and
language, I agree that the holding is correct and well
stated.
I have two language changes that I suggest you
bring to the attention of Justice Marshalls clerk.
the last sentence on p. 9 reads as follows:
"Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules,
[psychiatrists) can translate a medical
diagnosis into a legal conclusion • . • • "

Fir~t,

2.

The word "legal" clearly should be omitted.

No

witness - expert or otherwise - can express an opinion in
a trial as to a "legal" conclusion.
unnecessary.

Moreover, the word is

It would be better simply to say that the

psychiatrist can "translate his medical diagnosis into
language that will assist the trier of fact.

The

pyschiatrist may express his conclusion as the sanity of
the defendant and give his reasons.
The second language change that is not quite as
important, but it seems desirable.

In the first sentence

on p. 10, the opinion states that psychiatrists "ideal~y ;
empower lay jurors
is inappropriate.
anything.

"

The use of the word "empower"

No witness can "empower" jurors to do

As it is correctly stated on p. 11, the

psychiatrist can assist the jury in making a "sensible
determination".
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

j__u_- ~~ ~~ ~
i\u.prttttt <!}:ourl of tlrt 1utilt~ i\btit&
~ulfbtghtn. J. <!}:. 2llp,.~
December 18, 1984
CHAM1!5ERS OP'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 83-5424 - Ake v. Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood:
I have carefully studied your opinion and while I am still inclined to
go for the result, I have several problems.
1.

Section II.B. analyzes Ake's claim that he was deprived of expert
testimony during the sentencing phase of the trial. This section
is pretty much dicta and advisory. Since the opinion remands for
a new trial on guilt, any errors in the sentencing phase are now
moot.
The value of deferring ruling on this point is underscored by the
fact that the state psychiatrists who testified as to Ake's future
dangerousness were all called as defense witnesses. During the
sentencing phase the prosecutor merely referred to crossexamination testimony given by these defense witnesses during the
guilt phase. Even if we were to reach this issue, it is not clear
to me why prosecutorial reference to testimony given by defense
witnesses requires the state to provide additional defense
witnesses.

2.

On page 7, the defendant's interest in this case is stated to be
only that of avoiding an "erroneous conviction." Is this a
sufficient discussion of the defendant's interest?
The fact that this is a capital case is barely mentioned. The ~
prospect of a capital sentence is critical to this case. I doubt -1-0
that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide expert ~
witnesses generally to all cr'mina defendants. 9 ~ f :
~lYfA • ~

3.

•

~

,

~LLl._~

I wonder i ( we do not need to treat more fully the the costs to
the State. It is true, as you observe, that money is one cost
and, of course, it is also true that the State shares the interest
of defendants in securing an accurate verdict. But cost is not
the only factor; a court need not give every defendant a free
ert and must not be allowed to use this as a "gimmick" to delay
rial. The administrative burden of providing experts is also a
nificant factor.
The opinion st~tes ~
holdin_g_ at two different places. The
language--and, to some degree, the import--does not seem wholly
consistent. On page 4, the opinion states, "We hold that when a
defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the
time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial,
the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a
psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot

-

2 -

otherwise afford one.• (emphasis added) On page 12, you state,
•we therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial
judge that his mental condition is to be a significant factor at
trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defense access to ~,t.t.,a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
/
examination and and assist in evaluation, preparation and
presentation of the defense."
(emphasis added) I have two
problems: first, this suggests that a mere showing that the
insanity defense will be raised suffices to require the provision
of a psychiatrist, even without a showing that the claim has some
basis in fact; second, it blurs the distinction between a
defendant's "mental condition•--which could be read to be mean his
mens rea or clinical mental illness--and legal insanity.
----.;,

-

I believe the holding should be something along the following
line: "We hold that, when a defendant has made a preliminary
showing that his mental capacity and sanity at the time of the
offense is fairly in doubt and that his ability to comprehend the
nature and consequences of actions will be a significant issue at
trial, then the state must provide the defense access to a
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination.•
5.

You state on page 8 that "unlike a private litigant, a State may
not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic
advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to
cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained." While I
sympathize with the overall sentiment, I believe that this is
unnecessary to the holding in suggesting that the State generally
acts illegitimately in maintaining strategic advantages during the
course of the adversary process.

6.

I question whether footnotes 10 and 13 are necessary.

7.

A minor point: you refer throughout the opinion to
;
"psychiatrists." The American Psychological Association filed an
amicus brief suggesting that if a privilege was found to exist, it
should not be limited to psychiatrists, but should include other
behavior professionals such as clinical psychologists. I have no
strong feeling on this issue, but I wondered if we should not say
"behavioral specialists" or something along that line.

Sorry to be so long, but these points are important.

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

.fltJfrtnu <!fourl qf t4, ,ittittb .ttalt.G'

Jla#}ringfon, ,. Of. 2llffe'!~
CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 18, 1984

No. 83-5424

Ake v. Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood,
Like the Chief, I agree with the result reached in
your excellent opinion and hope to join it, at least insofar
as the guilt/innocence stage is concerned. With respect to
the sentencing phase, I also think that we need not decide
the issue and could simply remand.
I also agree with the Chief's suggested
formulation of the holding. I suppose a defendant's "mental
condition" is technically a significant factor in any
criminal case requiring proof of a specific intent. I had
thought our opinion would be limited to either capital cases
or cases where the defense of legal insanity was
sufficiently raised to justify the furnishing of the expert
services.
I am quite concerned about the implications of
FN 10 and would hope you would be willing to delete it as
unnecessary to your holding.
Finally, I thought the issue of whether there is
an adequate and independent state ground was an essential
jurisdictional point to be addressed preliminarily. I am
troubled that we would not address it at all since it was
argued. It can be answered by concluding under Oklahoma law
there was no independent state ground. I hope you are
content to deal with that point.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference

,•

alb

12/18/84

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: No. 83-5424, Ake v. Oklahoma
I talked to Justice Marshall's clerk about the two
changes that you suggested in the language of the opinion.

She

agreed that both of your suggestions would improve the opinion.
As you point out, an expert witness cannot express an opinion on
a "legal" conclusion, nor can he "empower" the jurors to do
anything.

Therefore, the second draft of the Marshall opinion

will incorporate these changes.
You also asked me to comment briefly on the Chief's
memo.

I think that only one of his problems is substantial.

I

agree that the language on page 12 should be changed so as to
make clear that the defendant must make a substantial showing
that his sanity is in doubt, not merely his mental condition.

I

do not believe, however, that the Chief's other proposals are
that helpful.
(1)

I will comment briefly on his other suggestions:

I think that the Court should address the necessity of

expert assistance in the sentencing 2hase where the state raises
the issue of future dangerousness.

The fact that the experts

were called by the state does not seem relevant.

The prosecution

elicited the testimony on future dangerousness on crossexamination, and it relied on this evidence at the sentencing
phase.

Moreover, the issue may arise again on remand if the

defendant's insanity defense is again rejected by the jury.

(2)

I do not think that there is any reason to limit the

right to a psychiatric expert to capital defendants.

As we

discussed, only defendants charged with serious crimes will raise
the insanity defense.
(3)

I think that the costs are discussed adequately.

The

Chief may have written this portion differently, but the point
does not seem that important.
(5) Ditto.

This language that the Chief finds objectionable

does not seem very important.
(6) Footnote 10 probably is unnecessary, but I do not think
that its deletion is critical.

This Court has used your opinion

in Matthews v. Eldridge in various contexts.

For example, in

Little v. Streater, a unanimous Court relied on Matthews to hold
that an indigent defendant in a paternity suit was entitled to a
blood test.

Footnote 10 simply makes the point that Matthews

might be used in other contexts even if the defendant does not
make a substantial showing that his sanity at the time of the
crime is an issue.
I think that footnote 13 is desirable, and it certainly "cut~
both ways."
(7)

I think that it might be better to define the right in

terms of "psychiatrists."

If this is not done, there is a chance

that the indigent's expert will perceived by the jury as lesseducated than the prosecution's witnesses.
Since we last talked, Justice O'Connor circulated a
brief memo.

The only new point she raises is that Justice

Marshall did not address the independent and adequate state

grounds argument.

This is a good suggestion, but I do not think

that discussion of this issue is essential unless it is raised in
Justice Rehnquist's dissent.

D~cember 19, 1984

83-5424 ~ke v . Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood:
1n light of chanqes in your opinion suggested by
other Justices, it may be helpful - in the event you make
cha.noes - to ha,,e my views .
In q~neral, I think your op1n1on is well written
and persuasive. T certainly agree with the judgment and
most of what you have said.

~s th~ only case before us is a caoital one, we
properly coulrl ljrnft our decision to such cases - though I
would not insist on t~iR. ~s n practical mattPr, the Aue
procPss reasoning of your opinion will apply equally in
noncanital cas s when th~ ~efen~ant ts charqerl with a ~erious crlme for which he may be imprisoneo for manv years . In
the absence nf threat of long imprisonment, few defendants
would wish to ole~~ insanity with its consequences of being
committed to a mental institution and bearing the stigma of
insanity.
0

I agree that wherg a ~e,endant pleads insanity and
'i\akes a sub~Jtant ial sho"linq of: n~erf, as in this case, there

is a due proc~ss right to the assistance of a psychiatrist
at the guilt stage ana also at the sentencing stage where
the statP reli.es on future danq~rousness . This was my vote
at Conferencf::'.
'T'he Chief :.1.nd Sanora have a good point , and no
~oubt you will agree, that the term "mental condition" could
be misunderstood . The defendant must make a substantial
showing that ~is sanity is in doubt .
Finally , I share the concern expressed about footnote 1.0 . I agree that the Matthews v . Eldridge balancing
analysis may be used in certain contexts . But this question
is not before us , and the note could well invite defendants
to raise issues th?.t will plague the courts .
Subject to these suggestions, I will be happy to

join your opinion .

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.t'uprmu ~(tut"i (tf tlft ~tt~ .t'tatts
,riudfitttlhrn. ~. ~. 2llffe~,
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

V
December 19, 1984

Re:

83-5424 - Ake v. Oklahoma

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me. I think there is a good deal of
merit in the Chief's and Sandra's suggestions, but I
am inclined to agree with you that we should retain
Part IIB because the question is so likely to arise
after the retrial and because this is a capital case.
Respectfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

,,.,o: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan

ff, 5-b_)~ 13; 17
o Id too-rft't:rte- 1tJ le let e J
~-~_!l ~..IJC

(.;k.D.A>,.:i.~ lM~rulf\t,
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-5424

GLEN BURTON AKE, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA

[December -

, 1984]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the Constitution requires
that an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric
examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective
.defense based on his mental condition, when his sanity at the
time of the offense is seriously in question.
I
Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged
with murdering a couple and wounding their two children.
He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County,
Okla., in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment, and
in other prearraignment incidents at the jail, was so bizarre
that the trial judge sua sponte ordered him to be examined
by a psychiatrist "for the purpose of advising with the Court
as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an
extended period of mental observation." App. 2. The
examining psychiatrist reported: "At times [Ake] appears to
be frankly delusional . . . . He claims to be the 'sword of
vengeance' of the Lord and that he will sit at the left hand of
God in heaven." Id., at 8. He diagnosed Ake as a probable
paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent
to stand trial.
In March, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined with respect to his "present sanity," i. e., his compe-

,;

;
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tency to stand trial. On April 10, less than six months after
the incidents for which Ake was indicted, the chief forensic
psychiatrist at the state hospital informed the court that Ake
was not competent to stand trial. The court then held a competency hearing, at which a psychiatrist testified:
"[Ake] is a psychotic ... his psychiatric diagnosis was
that of paranoid schizophrenia-chronic, with exacerbation, that is with current upset, and that in addition . . .
he is dangerous. . . . [B]ecause of the severity of his
mental illness and because of the intensities of his rage,
his poor control, his delusions, he requires a maximum
security facility within-I believe-the State Psychiatric
Hospital system." Id., at 11-12.
The court found Ake to be a "mentally ill person in need of
care and treatment" and incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental hospital.
Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed
the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial. At
the time, Ake was receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine, an
antipsychotic drug, three times daily, and the psychiatrist indicated that, if Ake continued to receive that dosage, his condition would remain stable. The State then resumed proceedings against Ake.
At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed
the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. To
enable him to prepare and present such a defense adequately,
the attorney stated, a psychiatrist would have to examine
Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the
offense. During Ake's 3-month stay at the state hospital, no
inquiry had been made into his sanity at the time of the offense, and, as an indigent, Ake could not afford to pay for a
psychiatrist. Counsel asked the court either to arrange to
have a psychiatrist perform the examination, or to provide
funds to allow the defense to arrange one. The trial judge
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rejected counsel's argument that the Federal Constitution requires that an indigent defendant receive the assistance of a
psychiatrist when that assistance is necessary to the defense,
and he denied the motion for a psychiatric evaluation at state
expense on the basis of this Court's decision in United States
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953).
Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree,
a crime punishable by death in Oklahoma, and for two counts
of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase of trial, his
sole defense was insanity. Although defense counsel called
to the stand and questioned each of the psychiatrists who had
examined Ake at the state hospital, none testified about his
mental state at the time of the offense because none had examined him on that point. The prosecution, in turn, asked
each of these psychiatrists whether he had performed or seen
the results of any examination diagnosing Ake's mental state
at the time of the offense, and each doctor replied that he had
not. As a result, there was no expert testimony for either
side on Ake's sanity at the time of the offense. The jurors
were then instructed that Ake could be found not guilty by
reason of insanity if he did not have the ability to distinguish
right from wrong at the time of the alleged offense. They
were further told that Ake was to be presumed sane at the
time of the crime unless he presented evidence sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt about his sanity at that time. If he
raised such a doubt in their minds, the jurors were informed,
the burden of proof shifted to the State to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 The jury rejected Ake's insanity
defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
1

Oklahoma Stat., Tit. 21, § 152 (1981) provides that "[a]ll persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes
.. . (4) Lunatics, insane persons and all persons of unsound mind , including
persons temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof that at the
time of committing the act charged against them they were incapable of
knowing its wrongfulness." The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has
held that there is an initial presumption of sanity in every case, "which remains until the defendant raises, by sufficient evidence, a reasonable doubt

;

;
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At the sentencing proceeding, the State asked for the
death penalty. No new evidence was presented. The prosecutor relied significantly on the testimony of the state psychiatrists who had examined Ake, and who had testified at
the guilt phase that Ake was dangerous to society, to establish the likelihood of his future dangerous behavior. Ake
had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce
on his behalf evidence in mitigation of his punishment. The
jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder
counts, and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two
counts of shooting with intent to kill.
On appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Ake
argued that, as an indigent defendant, he should have been
provided the services of a court-appointed psychiatrist. The
court rejected this argument, observing: "We have held numerous times that, the unique nature of capital cases notwithstanding, the State does not have the responsibility of
providing such services to· indigents charged with capital
crimes." 663 P. 2d 1, 6 (1983). Finding no error in Ake's
other claims, 2 the court affirmed the convictions and sentences. We granted certiorari. 465 U. S. - - (1984).
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary
showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to
be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that
as to his sanity at th~ time of the crime. If the issue is so raised, the burden of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt falls upon
the State. " 663 P. 2d 1, 10 (1983); see also Rogers v. State , 634 P . 2d 743
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981).
2
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also dismissed Ake's claim
that the Thorazine he was given during trial rendered him unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist counsel with his defense.
The court acknowledged that Ake "stared vacantly ahead throughout the
trial" but rejected Ake's challenge in reliance on a state psychiatrist's word
that Ake was competent to stand trial while under the influence of the
drug. 663 P. 2d, at 7-8. Ake petitioned for a writ of certiorari on this
issue as well. In light of our disposition of the other issues presented, we
need not address this claim.
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a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this
issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. Accordingly, we reverse.
II
Initially, we must address our jurisdiction to review this
case. After ruling on the merits of Ake's claim, the Oklahoma court observed that in his motion for a new trial Ake
had not repeated his request for a psychiatrist and that the
claim was thereby waived. 663 P. 2d, at 6. The court cited
Hawkins v. State, 569 P. 2d 490 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977), for
this proposition. The State argued in its brief to this Court
that the court's holding on this issue therefore rested on an
adequate and independent state ground and ought not be reviewed. Despite the court's state law ruling, we conclude
that the state court's judgment does not rest on an independent state ground and that our jurisdiction is therefore properly exercised.
The Oklahoma waiver rule does not apply to fundamental
trial error. See Hawkins v. State, supra, at 493; Gaddis v.
State, 447 P. 2d 42, 45-46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968). Under
Oklahoma law, and as the State conceded at oral argument,
federal constitutional errors are "fundamental." Tr. of Oral
Arg. 51-52; see Buchanan v. State, 523 P. 2d 1134, 1137
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (violation of constitutional right constitutes fundamental error); see also Williams v. State, 658
P. 2d 499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Thus, the State has
made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of
whether federal constitutional error has been committed.
Before applying the waiver doctrine to a constitutional question, the state court must rule, either explicitly or implicitly,
on the merits of the constitutional question.
As we have indicated in the past, when resolution of the
state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state law prong of the court's holding is not
independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not pre-

;
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eluded. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 126 (1945)
("We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if
the same judgment would be rendered by the state court
after we corrected its views of Federal laws, our review
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion");
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal
Co., 243 U. S. 157, 164 (1917) ("But where the non-Federal
ground is so interwoven with the other as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain the
judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction
is plain"). In such a case, the federal law holding is integral
to the state court's disposition of the matter, and our ruling
on the issue is in no respect advisory. In this case, the additional holding of the state court-that the constitutional challenge presented here was waived-depends on the court's
federal law ruling and consequently does not present an independent state ground for the decision rendered. We therefore turn to a consideration of the merits of Ake's claim.

III
This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its
judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant
has a fair opportunity to present his defense. This elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal
where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. In recognition of
this right, this Court held almost 30 years ago that once a
State offers to criminal defendants the opportunity to appeal
their cases, it must provide a trial transcript to an indigent
defendant if the transcript is necessary to a decision on the
merits of the appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956).
Since then, this Court has held that an indigent defendant
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may not be required to pay a fee before filing a notice of appeal of his conviction, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 (1959),
that an indigent defendant is entitled to the assistance of
counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963)
and on his first direct appeal as of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), and that such assistance must be
effective. See Evitts v. Lucey, - - U. S. - - (1985);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. - - (1984); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970). 3 Indeed, in
Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1 (1981), we extended this principle of meaningful participation to a "quasi-criminal" proceeding and held that, in a paternity action, the State cannot deny
the putative father blood grouping tests, if he cannot otherwise afford them.
Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme
of these cases. We recognized long ago that mere access to
the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and tha;t a criminal trial is
fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to
the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense. Thus, while the Court has not held that a State must
purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his
wealthier counterpart might buy, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U. S. 600 (1974), it has often reaffirmed that fundamental
fairness entitles indigent defendants to "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system," id., at 612. To implement this principle, we have
focused on identifying the "basic tools of an adequate defense
or appeal," Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226, 227
(1971), and we have required that such tools be provided to
those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them. ·
This Court has recently discussed the role that due process has played
in such cases, and the separate but related inquiries that due process and
equal protection must trigger. See Evitts v. Lucey, U. S. (1985); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660 (1983).
3
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To say that these basic tools must be provided is, of course,
merely to begin our inquiry. In this case we must decide
whether, and under what conditions, the participation of a
psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a defense
to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with access to competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the defense. Three factors are relevant to this determination.
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the
action of the State. The second is the governmental interest
that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The
third is the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards
are not provided. See Little v. Streater, supra, at 6;
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). We turn,
then, to apply this standard to the issue before us.
A

The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost
uniquely compelling. Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned by this Court over the years to diminish the risk of
erroneous conviction stands as a testament to that concern.
The interest of the individual in the outcome of the State's
effort to overcome the presumption of innocence is obvious
and weighs heavily in our analysis.
We consider, next, the interest of the State. Oklahoma
asserts that to provide Ake with psychiatric assistance on the
record before us would result in a staggering burden to the
State. Brief for Respondent 46-47. We are unpersuaded
by this assertion. Many States, as well as the Federal Government, currently make psychiatric assistance available to
indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial
burden so great as to preclude this assistance. 4 This is espe' See Ala. Code § 15-12-21 (Supp. 1984); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.85.100
(1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4013 (1978) (capital cases; extended to

,
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cially so when the obligation of the State is limited to provision of one competent psychiatrist, as it is in many States,
and as we limit the right we recognize today. At the same
time, it is difficult to identify any interest of the State, other
than that in its economy, that weighs against recognition of
this right. The State's interest in prevailing at trial-unlike
that of a private litigant-is necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases.
Thus, also unlike a private litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic advannoncapital cases in State v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P. 2d 335 (App.
1980)); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 17-456 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 987.9
(West Supp. 1984) (capital cases; right recognized in all cases in People v.
Worihy, 109 Cal.App. 3d 514, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1980)); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-1-403 (Supp. 1984); State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, 363 A. 2d 33
(1975); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 4603 (1983); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.216;
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 802-7 (Supp. 1983); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.
2d 203 (1982); P~ople v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N. E. 2d 645 (1966);
Owen v. State, 272 Ind. 122, 396 N. E. 2d 376 (1979) (trial judge may authorize or appoint experts where necessary); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 19;
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4508 (Supp. 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 31.070, 31.110,
31.185 (1980); State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485 (La. 1977); State v. Anaya,
456 A. 2d 1255 (Me. 1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 621, § 27C(4) (West
Supp. 1984-1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.20a(3) (Supp. 1983);
Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1983);
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-201 (1983); State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 264
N. W. 2d 876 (1978) (discretion to appoint psychiatrist rests with trial
court); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 7.135 (1983); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:6
(Supp. 1983); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-16-2, 31-16-8 (1984); N. Y. County
Law § 722~ (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-454
(1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.51 (Supp. 1983); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 135.055(4) (1983); Commonwealth v. Gelormo, Pa. Super. - ,
- , and n. 5, 475 A. 2d 765, 769, and n. 5 (1984); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 9-17-19 (Supp. 1984); S. C. Code§ 17-3-80 (Supp. 1983); S. D. Codified
Laws § 23A-40-8 (Supp. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-207 (Supp. 1984);
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. § 26.05 (Vernon Supp. 1984); Utah Code
Ann. § 77-32-1 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 10. 77.020, 10. 77.060 (1983) (see
also State v. Cunningham, 18 Wash. App. 517, 569 P. 2d 1211 (1977)); W.
Va. Code § 29-21-14(e)(3) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-1-108; 7-1-110;
7-1-116 (1977).
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tage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to
cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained. We
therefore conclude that the governmental interest in denying
Ake the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in light
of the compelling interest of both the State and the individual
in accurate dispositions.
Last, we inquire into the probable value of the psychiatric
assistance sought, and the risk of error in the proceeding if
such assistance is not offered. We begin by considering the
pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings. More than 40 States, as well as the Federal Government, have decided either through legislation or judicial
decision that indigent defendants are entitled, under certain
circumstances, to the assistance of a psychiatrist's expertise. 5 For example, in subsection (e) of the Criminal Justice
Act, 18 U. S. C. §3006A, Congress has provided that indigent defendants shall receive the assistance of all experts
"ne~essary for an adequate defense," Numerous state statutes guarantee reimbursement for expert services under a
like standard. And in many States that have not assured access to psychiatrists through the legislative process, state
courts have interpreted the State or Federal Constitution to
require that psychiatric assistance be provided to indigent
defendants when necessary for an adequate defense, or when
insanity is at issue. 6
These statutes and court decisions reflect a reality that we
recognize today, namely, that when the State has made the
defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a
psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to
marshal his defense. In this role, psychiatrists gather facts,
both through professional examination, interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible con5
6

See n. 4, supra.
Ibid.

;
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clusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about
the effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how the defendant's mental condition might have
affected his behavior at the time in question. They know the
probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers. Unlike lay witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe
might be relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists can identify the "elusive and of ten deceptive" symptoms of insanity, Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, 12 (1950),
and tell the jury why their observations are relevant. Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can
translate a medical diagnosis into . language that will assist
the trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that
has meaning for the task at hand. Through this process of
investigation, interpretation and testimony, psychiatrists
ideally assist lay jurors, who generally have no training in
psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated determination about the mental condition of the defendant at the
time of the offense.
Psychiatry is not, however, an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to
given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on
likelihood of future dangerousness. Perhaps because there
often is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given case, juries remain the primary factfinders
on this issue, and they must resolve differences in opinion
within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the evidence
offered by each party. When jurors make this determination about issues that inevit!lbly are complex and foreign) the
testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and "a virtual necessity if an insanity plea is to have any chance of success." 7
Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert-Some Comments Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of
Therapy, 2 Law & Psychology Rev. 99, 113-114 (1976). In addition,
1
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By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior, and other information, interpreting it in
light of their expertise, and then laying out their investigative and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists for
each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue before them. It is for this
reason that States rely on psychiatrists as examiners, consultants, and witnesses, and that private individuals do as well,
when they can afford to do so. 8 In so saying, we neither approve nor disapprove the widespread reliance on psychiatrists but instead recognize the unfairness of a contrary holding in light of the evolving practice.
The foregoing leads inexorably to the conclusion that, without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional
examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a
"[t]estimony emanating from the depth and scope of specialized knowledge
is very impressive to a jury. The same testimony from another source can
have less effect." F . Bailey & H. Rothblatt, Investigation and Preparation of Criminal Cases § 175 (1970); see also ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice 5-1.4, Commentary, p. 5-20 (2d ed. 1982) ("The quality ofrepresentation at trial . . . may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if the
defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist ... and no such services
are available").
8
See also Reilly v. Barry, 250 N. Y. 456, 461, 166 N. E. 165, 167 (1929)
(Cardozo, C. J.) ("[U]pon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or
forgery , experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense. . . . [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, ifhe is unable
because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those
against him"; 2 I. Goldstein & F . Lane, Goldstein Trial Techniques § 14.01
(2d ed. 1969) ("Modern civilizmion, with its complexities of business, science, and the professions, has made expert and opinion evidence a necessity. This is true where the subject matters involved are beyond the general knowledge of the average juror"); Henning, The Psychiatrist in the
Legal Process, in By Reason of Insanity: Essays on Psychiatry and the
Law 217, 219-220 (L. Freedman ed., 1983) (discussing the growing role of
psychiatric witnesses as a result of changing definitions of legal insanity
and increased judicial and legislative acceptance of the practice).

;

,,.
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State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high. With such assistance, the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough
information to the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit
it to make a sensible determination.
A defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in
every criminal proceeding, however, and it is unlikely that
psychiatric assistance of the kind we have described would be
of probable value in cases where it is not. The risk of error
from denial of such assistance, as well as its probable value,
are most predictably at their height when the defendant's
mental condition is seriously in question. When the defendant is a_ble to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial
court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his
defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is
readily apparent. It is in such cases that a defense may be
devastated by the absence of a psychiatric examination and
testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a
reasonable chance of success. In such a circumstance, where
the potential accuracy of the jury's determination is so dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual
and the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the
State's interest in its fisc must yield. 9
We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to
the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to
be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum,
assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is
not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking
·or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the
9

In any event, before this Court the State concedes that such a right
exists but argues only that it is not implicated here. Brief for Respondent
45; Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. It therefore recognizes that the financial burden is
not always so great as to outweigh the individual interest.
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indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist
for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the
provision of counsel we leave to the States the decision on
how to implement this right.
B

Ake also was denied the means of presenting evidence to
rebut the State's evidence of his future dangerousness. The
foregoing discussion compels a similar conclusion in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, when the State
presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness. We have repeatedly recognized the defendant's
compelling interest in fair adjudication at the sentencing
phase of a capital case. The State, too, has a profound interest in assuring that its ultimate sanction is not erroneously
imposed, and we do not see why monetary considerations
should be more persuasive in this context than at trial. The
variable on which we must focus is, therefore, the probable
value that the assistance of a psychiatrist will have in this
area, and the risk attendant on its absence.
This Court has upheld the practice in many States of placing before the jury psychiatric testimony on the question of
future dangerousness, see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 800,
896-905 (1983), at least where the defendant has had access
to an expert of his own, id., at 899, n. 5. In so holding, the
Court relied, in part, on the assumption that the factfinder
would have before it both the views of the prosecutor's psychiatrists and the "opposing views of the defendant's doctors"
and would therefore be competent to "uncover, recognize,
and take due account of . . . shortcomings" in predictions on
this point. Id., at 899. Without a psychiatrist's assistance,
the defendant cannot offer a well-informed expert's opposing
view, and thereby loses a significant opportunity to raise in
the jurors' minds questions about the State's proof of an aggravating factor. In such a circumstance, where the consequence of error is so great, the relevance of responsive psy-

;

;
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chiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the State so
slim, due process requires access to a psychiatric examination
on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and
to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.
C

The trial court in this case believed that our decision in
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953),
absolved it completely of the obligation to provide access to a
psychiatrist. For two reasons, we disagree. First, neither
Smith, nor McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F. 2d 151, 155 (CAl
1951), to which the majority cited in Smith, even suggested
that the Constitution does not require any psychiatric examination or assistance whatsoever. Quite to the contrary, the
record in Smith demonstrated that neutral psychiatrists in
fact had examined the defendant as to his sanity and had testified on that subject at trial, and it was on that basis that the
Court found no additional assistance was necessary. Smith,
supra, at 568; see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
192 F. 2d 540, 547 (CA3 1951). Similarly, in McGarty, the
defendant had been examined by two psychiatrists who were
not beholden to the prosecution. We therefore reject the
State's contention that Smith supports the broad proposition
that "[t]here is presently no constitutional right to have a
psychiatric examination of a defendant's sanity at the time of
the offense." Brief in Opposition 8. At most it supports the
proposition that there is no constitutional right to more psychiatric assistance than the defendant in Smith had received.
In any event, our disagreement with the State's reliance on
Smith is more fundamental. That case was decided at a time
when indigent defendants in state courts had no constitutional right to even the presence of counsel. Our recognition
since then of elemental constitutional rights, each of which
has enhanced the ability of an indigent defendant to attain a
fair hearing, has signaled our increased commitment to assuring meaningful access to the judicial process. Also, neither
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trial practice nor legislative treatment of the role of insanity
in the criminal process sits paralyzed simply because this
Court has once addressed them, and we would surely be remiss to ignore the extraordinarily enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law today. 10 Shifts in all these areas since the
time of Smith convince us that the opinion in that case was
addressed to altogether different variables, and that we are
not limited by it in considering whether fundamental fairness
today requires a different result.
IV
We turn now to apply these standards to the facts of this
case. On the record before us, it is clear that Ake's mental
state at- the time of the offense was a substantial factor in his
defense, and that the trial court was on notice of that fact
when the request for a court-appointed psychiatrist was
made. For one, Ake's sole defense was that of insanity.
Second, Ake's behavior at arraignment, just four months
after the offense, was so bizarre as to prompt the trial judge,
sua sponte, to have him examined for competency. Third, a
state psychiatrist shortly thereafter found Ake to be incompetent to stand trial) and suggested that he be committed.
Fourth, when he was found to be competent six weeks later,
it was only on the condition that he be sedated with large
doses of Thorazine three times a day, during trial. Fifth,
the psychiatrists who examined Ake for competency described to the trial court the severity of Ake's mental illness
less than six months after the offense in question, and suggested that this mental illness might have begun many years
earlier. App. 35. Finally, Oklahoma recognizes a defense
of insanity, under which the initial burden of producing evi10

See Henning, su'[YT'a n. 8; Gardner, SU'[YT'a n. 7, at 99; H. Huckabee,
Lawyers, Psychiatrists and Criminal law: Cooperation or Chaos? 179-181
(1980) (discussing reasons for the shift toward reliance on psychiatrists);
Huckabee, Resolving the Problem of Dominance of Psychiatrists in Criminal Responsibility Decisions: A Proposal, 27 Sw. L. J. 790 (1973).
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dence falls on the defendant. 11 Taken together, these factors
make clear that the question of Ake's sanity was likely to be a
significant factor in his defense. 12
In addition, Ake's future dangerousness was a significant
factor at the sentencing phase. The state psychiatrist who
treated Ake at the state mental hospital testified at the guilt
phase that, because of his mental illness, Ake posed a threat
of continuing criminal violence. This testimony raised the
issue of Ake's future dangerousness, which is an aggravating
factor under Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme, Okla.
Stat. Tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (1981), and on which the prosecutor
relied at sentencing. We therefore conclude that Ake also
was entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist on this issue
and that the denial of that assistance deprived him of due
process. 13
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
It is so ordered.

See n. 1, su-pra.
.
We express no opinion as to whether any of these factors, alone or in /
combination, is necessary to make this finding.
18
Because we conclude that the Due Process Clause guaranteed to Ake
the assistance he requested and was denied, we have no occasion to consider the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, in this context.
11

12
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